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Abstract 
 
This paper analyses the patterns of regional growth and development in Yugoslavia, under the most 
decentralised socialist system that ever existed. My analysis reveals that despite government efforts to the 
contrary, socialist economic development in Yugoslavia resulted in divergence rather than in convergence 
between the constituent regions. I find that regional income divergence was caused by the failure of the less 
developed regions to converge towards the employment rates and total factor productivities of the more 
developed regions. I interpret these failures as symptoms of a single underlying problem: a capital intensity 
bias inherent to the governing objective of labour-managed firms. Socialist Yugoslavia moved from having 
one central plan, to having many mutually competitive plans. While on aggregate this may have created a net 
positive productivity outcome compared to other socialist economies, it created unique distortions. The 
decentralisation policies were implemented with the aim of enhancing regional cohesion and social stability. 
They led, however, to exactly opposite outcomes. 
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1 Introduction
Policy makers must pay attention to regional inequality because of its impact on welfare. Re-
gional inequality contributes to overall inequality. It can undermine social cohesion and infuse
political tensions (see e.g. in Belgium, Italy and Spain). This seems particularly likely in coun-
tries where labour is immobile, and where regional distribution of income coincides with the
spatial distribution of ethnic groups. This was the case in socialist Yugoslavia. The country
was extremely heterogeneous. It was divided into six Republics (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia,
Macedonia, Montenegro, Slovenia and Serbia) and two Autonomous Provinces that were part of
Serbia (Kosovo and Vojvodina). These regions were divided along many lines. Yugoslavs were
fond of describing their country as one with two alphabets, three religions, four languages, and
five nations.
Reduction of regional inequality was a major priority of Yugoslav authorities (Bičanić, 1973;
Pleština, 1992). In order to foster convergence in regional economic development and to preserve
social stability, Yugoslav government 1) devolved power to its constituent Republics, 2) trans-
ferred control over prices, output, and enterprise budgets to labour-managed firms further down
the aggregation level, and 3) and directed massive capital transfers from the more to the less
developed regions. Yugoslavia developed the most decentralised socialist system in the world,
symbolising to many a viable market socialist system (Vanek and Jovičić, 1975; Horvat, 1982).
Despite the intention of these institutional changes and policy efforts, initially more devel-
oped regions (Croatia, Slovenia and Vojvodina) grew faster than the initially less developed
regions (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro) (implied by figure 1 within
a European perspective) (Milanović, 1987; Bateman, Nishimizu, and Page, 1988; Kraft, 1992).1
Thus, one question arises: why did the less developed regions (LDRs) grow slower than the more
developed regions (MDRs), causing regional income divergence?
This paper analyses the proximate sources of growth in Yugoslavia - probably the most pecu-
liar case from which we can learn about the economics of regional development under socialism.
I utilise new estimates of output, as well as physical and human capital. I apply standard growth
and development accounting methods to construct the regional development trajectories. Since
1I follow the existing literature in the categorisation of the more developed and the less developed regions
(Milanović, 1987; Bateman, Nishimizu, and Page, 1988; Kraft, 1992). The classification is somewhat simplistic,
however, it yields the benefit of easing analytical exposition. It allows me to compare and contrast groups of
regions, rather than cumbersomely comparing and contrasting each region to another. Serbia is, however, an
intermediate case. It closely tracked the mean and median of Yugoslavia across a range of development indicators.
I thus do not treat Serbia as either the more or the less developed region.
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Figure 1: GDP per capita of Yugoslav regions relative to the GDP per capita of the Western
European core, the European periphery, and Eastern Europe, in %, 1953-89
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Kingdom. Peripheral European countries are Ireland, Greece, Spain, and Portugal. Eastern European
countries are Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania.
Sources: For Yugoslav regions see section 5. Otherwise, data is taken from Bolt and van Zanden (2014).
Allen (2003) and Cheremukhin, Golosov, Guriev, and Tsyvinski (2015, 2017) argue that realloca-
tion gains associated with the transfer of inputs from agriculture to manufacturing were a major
boon to socialist economic growth, I adjust the accounting methods so they can determine the
contribution of structural modernisation to aggregate efficiency and hence economic growth.2
The analysis of proximate sources of growth provides a useful preliminary diagnostic function
before engaging in deeper explorations of the ultimate sources of growth. For instance, If TFP
was the main contributor to regional divergence, researchers should focus on analysing factors
that distorted efficiency and the accumulation of technology in poorer regions. If, instead, inputs
were the main contributor to regional divergence, researchers should focus on analysing factors
that distorted the expansion of labour and capital in poorer regions.
2More generally, reallocation gains are considered to be a major source of Europe’s Golden Age of economic
growth during the 1950s and the 1960s (Temple, 2001; Temin, 2002). In this paper, I use the phrases “structural
modernisation”, “structural change”, and “reallocation gains” interchangeably.
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I find that the LDRs grew slower than the MDRs because they failed to converge towards the
employment rates and total factor productivities (TFP) of the MDRs. I interpret these failures
as symptoms of a single underlying factor - a capital intensity bias inherent to the governing
objective of labour managed firms. The argument is based on three premises. First, labour-
managed firms were attempting to maximise income per worker through substituting capital for
labour. Second, the capital intensity bias was particularly strong in the LDRs due to a range
of factors, including capital aid and financial repression. Importantly, the bias towards capital
intensity was pernicious in the LDRs because they were characterised by labour abundance.
Third, substitution of capital for labour retarded employment rates in the LDRs relative to the
MDRs. It furthermore caused a divergence in regional TFP trajectories through particularly
retarding labour utilisation rates in the LDRs, and by stimulating firms in the LDRs to economise
on the relatively abundant factor of production, i.e. labour.
The findings and interpretations of this paper contribute to the literature on economic de-
velopment in socialist Europe. I provide a spatial dimension to the study of economic growth
under socialism, which is otherwise neglected in the existing literature. This neglect seems un-
usual because egalitarianism was one of the defining features of socialism. There is, however,
one practical reason for the paucity of research. There were only two countries in the region
during the 20th century characterised by a comprehensive coverage of regional socio-economic
indicators - the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.3
The existing literature on economic growth under socialism focuses on analysing the relative
contributions of factors of production and TFP to economic growth at the aggregate level. The
general aim is to determine the sources of decline of socialist economies. The debate is centred
on the nature of the socialist production function. With unit factor substitution, the decline
is attributed to diminishing TFP growth (Bergson, 1979, 1987; Gomulka, 1977; van Ark, 1996;
Allen, 2003). With low elasticity of factor substitution, the decline is attributed to diminishing
marginal product of capital (MPK) (Weitzman, 1970; Desai, 1976; Sapir, 1980; Rusek, 1989;
Easterly and Fischer, 1995). I contribute to this strand of literature by moving beneath the
aggregate growth patterns. I find that regional growth accounts resist monocausal explanations.
TFP was a more important source of growth in the MDRs than it was in the LDRs. The LDRs
3With the notable exception of Milanović (1987) and Bateman, Nishimizu, and Page (1988), the existing
research on Yugoslavia typically does not dig deeper into the underlying drivers of regional inequality, or the
broader implications of increasing regional disparities. This paper makes a novel contribution to this literature
by analysing the sources of regional patterns of economic growth.
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experienced declining MPK, while the MDRs did not experience declining MPK.
At a more fundamental level, the collapse of socialist economies is attributed to the embed-
ded inefficiencies of socialism (von Mises, 1922/1981; Hayek, 1945; Kornai, 1980). Incentives for
innovation and labour were poor (Berliner, 1976; Ofer, 1987), the system was coercive (Harrison,
2002), and unable to adapt to the requirements of flexible production technology (Broadberry
and Klein, 2011). The majority of existing studies covering socialist Europe focus on the general
features of socialist systems that had no between, and especially no within country differences.
Instead, I argue that a single national institution had a differential impact on regional devel-
opment trajectories. Along the broadly conceived terminology of Abramovitz (1986), labour-
managed firms were less technologically congruent with the local factor endowments and other
factors in the LDRs than they were in the MDRs.
This paper also contributes to the wider debates concerning global postwar convergence
patterns and the (normative) role of aid. During the postwar period, there was strong income
convergence among the OECD members. Globally however, the same period was marked by
income divergence (see Crafts and O’Rourke (2014) for a survey). This has fuelled the debates
about the desirability of aid. In particular, if poor countries are locked in poverty traps because
they lack the resources to invest in factors of productions and technology and/or have low
incentives to invest because of increasing returns (Azariadis and Stachurski, 2005), aid might
enable such countries to escape from poverty traps and achieve successful growth takeoffs (Sachs,
2005).
Yugoslavia is unique in the global perspective in the sense that it tried to integrate high-
middle-income (Slovenia), middle-income (Croatia and Vojvodina) and lower-middle-income
regions (Serbia), with backward regions (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, and
Kosovo).4 It tried to stimulate the integrative processes through capital aid. The experience of
Yugoslavia provides a cautionary tale concerning the impact of aid flows. Increased aid flows to
developing countries might indeed strongly boost convergence in capital intensities. However, if
global differences in the MPK are negligible, or if MPK tends to be higher in poorer countries in
the extreme case, this will need to be accompanied by financial repression, as Caselli and Feyrer
(2007) argue. Capital outflows will need to be effectively banned in poor countries, as private
investment will otherwise flow from poor to rich countries. If so, increased aid flows will be a
4Today (2017), the World Bank classifies Croatia and Slovenia as high-income economies, it classifies Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia as upper-middle-income economies, and treats Kosovo as a
lower-middle-income economy.
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move towards inefficiency, rather than efficiency, just like it seems it was the case in Yugoslavia.
It seems unlikely this would lead to successful growth takeoffs.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of
decentralisation and regional development policies in Yugoslavia. Section 3 presents the patterns
of regional inequality. In section 4, I sketch the theoretical predictions on regional patterns
of growth and convergence, and discuss the approach used to decompose labour productivity
growth. Section 5 describes the data and the newly constructed variables. Section 6 presents
the results, while section 7 provides an interpretation of results based on a combination of
institutional and policy-related factors. The final section 8 provides a conclusion.
2 Historical context: Decentralisation and regional development
policies
After World War II, the Communist Party seized power. Yugoslavia was reorganised into a
federation. The aim was to heal Yugoslavia’s ethnic and regional tensions stemming from WWII
and the interwar period. Each federal unit approximated the spatial distribution of the major
ethnic groups that inhabited the country. The communists adopted a form of government that
promised political equalisation to the major ethnicities that formed the country.
In the initial phase of Yugoslavia’s socialist experiment, the authorities pursued the standard
centrally planned development model of the Soviet Union. The economic system did not differ
in any meaningful sense from those that were implemented in the Soviet-dominated countries
in Europe (Horvat, 1971). All investment decisions were taken by the federal centre. Regional
development policies did not truly exist in this early stage of development (Pleština, 1992).
The 1948 conflict between Tito, the lifelong president of Yugoslavia, and Stalin, the leader of
Soviet Union, was a pivotal moment in Yugoslavia’s history.5 As a consequence of the conflict,
the Yugoslav communist leadership sought to distance the country from the Soviet Union and
its ideology by constructing a unique version of socialism. The Yugoslav communists had to
rebrand themselves. The new ideological consensus was that the state should be gradually
weakened during the transition to the communist utopia. It was based on the Marxist notion
that the state should “wither away” (Jović, 2009). The “withering” of the Yugoslav state can
be best perceived as decentralisation of economic and political power. Decentralised, or even
5See Rajak (2011) for a description of the episode.
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polycentric, socialism was achieved in two ways.
First, political and economic power was transferred from the Federation to the federal units.
The turning point was the 1965 socio-economic reform. The federal units obtained the means
to stimulate their own economic development. This was partly motivated by the then apparent
sharp increase in regional inequality (Bičanić, 1973). The 1965 reforms included the establish-
ment of the “Federal Fund for Crediting Accelerated Development of In-Sufficiently Developed
Republics and Autonomous Provinces” (Federal Fund). The Federal Fund was a vehicle which
transferred capital from the MDRs to the LDRs. Funds were raised by taxation of firms in the
richer regions. The tax was approximately equivalent to 1.9 per cent of their output (Bateman,
Nishimizu, and Page, 1988). The recipient regions had full discretion over the allocation of cap-
ital aid. This does not mean that the LDRs did not receive federal aid before the establishment
of the Federal Fund. Before 1965, capital was directly transferred from the federal investment
fund to firms in poorer regions.
In addition to the Federal Fund, the federal centre transferred capital through the federal
budget to the regional authorities, earmarked for the expansion of public amenities. On average,
according to official statistics, federal aid was equivalent to more than 10 per cent of gross
investment in Bosnia-Herzegovina since 1965.6 It was approximately equivalent to 20 per cent
of gross investment in Macedonia and Montenegro. In Kosovo, these transfers amounted on
average to approximately 60 per cent of gross investment, reaching extremely high levels during
the 1980s.
The effort to reduce the large interregional income differences has primarily consisted of
capital aid. Internal trade policies to protect infant industries in the LDRs were prevented in
order to stimulate national market integration. Low interregional labour mobility prevented
productivity arbitration based on wage differentials (see section 7).
Second, further down the aggregation level, control over prices, output, and enterprise bud-
gets, was gradually devolved to labour-managed firms. Next to ideological reasons, the aim was
to eliminate bureaucratic waste and to make firms more responsive to the local environment, and
hence to potentially stimulate regional equalisation of incomes through efficiency improvements
(Horvat, 1971). Work councils of labour-managed firms, supposedly representing the interests
of workers, could, in conjunction with the local government, hire and fire the managers of the
enterprise. They could decide, to a degree, on the marketing and production processes of an
6Jugoslavija 1918-1988: Statistički Godišnjak (Savezni Zavod za Statistiku (1989)).
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enterprise. Over time, workers were granted rights over the income derived from fixed assets.
Residual income, i.e. income net of depreciation allowances, interest repayments, and similar
categories, could be subsequently allocated between wages and investment (Estrin, 1983).
Irrespective of capital aid, the establishment of labour-managed firms led to an effective
ban on interregional capital flows. Firms were reluctant to invest in new ventures outside their
domicile region because the returns were highly uncertain. The new venture could unilaterally
proclaim itself autonomous. If so, investment made by the founding firm would be treated as
a credit to be repaid at a low rate of interest. This feature derives from the nature of labour-
managed firm. Labour management is impossible if decisions about the firm are to be made by
an external investor.
Interregional capital immobility was the intention of federal policy makers. Next to the
aforementioned feature of labour-managed firms, the Federal Fund ensured that poorer regions
would be able to accumulate capital. Bateman, Nishimizu, and Page (1988) argue that policy
makers feared that capital would otherwise flow to richer regions, buttressing regional inequality.
Section 7 demonstrates that their fears were justified. The MPK was higher in the MDRs than
it was in the LDRs. If capital was mobile, it would have flown from poorer to richer regions,
due to higher returns it could have realised there.
3 Regional inequality
This section presents stylised facts on regional inequality. Figure 1 indicates that Slovenia,
Croatia and Vojvodina grew strongly given their initial income levels, converging towards the
core countries of Western Europe. Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, on the other hand, performed
poorly. This suggests increasing regional inequality in Yugoslavia.
These growth trends indeed led to income divergence between the Yugoslav regions. Figure
2 displays information on the evolution of inequality through three measures - the Gini coeffi-
cient, the Theil index, and the coefficient of variation (CV). All three measures depict the same
increasing trend concerning regional income p.c. inequality until the late 1970s (panels a, b, and
c in figure 2). During the 1980s, inequality remained roughly constant because economic growth
across all regions ceased.
To put Yugoslavia’s experience in context; the average regional Gini coefficient for all OECD
countries in 2010 stood at 0.16 (OECD, 2013). This is significantly lower than in Yugoslavia
7
Figure 2: Regional inequality as depicted by the Gini coefficient, coefficient of variation (CV)
and the Theil index, 1952-89
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A.2.
Source: See section 5.
at any point in time. Furthermore, the dispersion of regional income levels in Yugoslavia was
higher than the current dispersion of income levels among the member states of the European
Union (EU) (see Monfort (2008) for data on EU).
The Yugoslav experience is instead more similar to that of regionally heterogeneous devel-
oping countries nowadays. In 2010, in China, India and Brazil, regional Gini coefficient ranged
between 0.27 and 0.29 (OECD, 2013). This is similar to historic peak value of Gini coefficient in
Yugoslavia in 1979 (0.26). Concerning the evolution of regional inequality in developing coun-
tries, it is difficult to find common patterns. Milanović (2005) studies four developing (quasi)
federations since about 1980. In China, he finds that regional disparities have overall remained
constant, even though inequality has fluctuated between sub-periods. In India and Indonesia he
finds increasing inequality. In Brazil he finds no trend. In contrast, Azzoni (2001) studies Brazil
over a longer period (1939-95), and finds overall decline.
Notwithstanding these contemporary similarities and differences in regional inequality, com-
pared to other peripheral European countries at a broadly similar level of economic development
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during the postwar period, like Greece, Portugal, and Spain, Yugoslavia was the only economy
characterised by regional income divergence.7
Which proximate factors caused regional income divergence in Yugoslavia? There are three
possible explanations: 1) labour productivity, 2) employment, and 3) demography (working-
age population rate).8 Concerning 1), in contrast to regional income p.c. trends, inequality of
labour productivity levels remained constant (figure 2.d). The dispersion of labour productivity
levels initially increased until 1961. During the subsequent decades, it decreased to a level
similar to the one observed in 1953. Concerning 2) and 3), figure 3 reveals that the regional
dispersion of employment rates tripled during the sample period, while dispersion of working-age
population rates has slightly decreased. The divergence in regional income levels was thus caused
by divergence of employment rates, and by the absence of convergence in labour productivity
levels. Before assessing why was this the case, it is necessary to analyse the regional sources of
labour productivity growth.
4 Theory and methodology
4.1 Theory
How to study regional development and convergence? Due to high interdependence among re-
gions, this is a complex area of inquiry that involves a multitude of theoretical and empirical
approaches (Breinlich, Ottaviano, and Temple, 2014). To impose structure, it is necessary to ac-
knowledge theoretical predictions from economic growth theory. First, the textbook Solow-Swan
growth model would predict growth and convergence on the basis of physical and human capital
deepening. Poor regions are characterised by capital scarcity of both types, low productivity,
and by extension high marginal products of factors of productions. Accumulation of factors, due
to higher returns, leads poorer regions to grow faster than the richer regions. In the presence
of mobile factors of production, convergence is facilitated by migration of labour to rich regions
(where wages are higher), and by migration of capital to poor regions (where rents are higher).
These processes cause the equalisation of factor prices and factor proportions.
Second, endogenous growth models view the process of convergence as facilitated through
7See Petrakos and Saratsis (2000) for Greece, see Martínez-Galarraga, Rosés, and Tirado (2013) for Spain,
and see Badia-Miró, Guilera, and Lains (2012) for Portugal.
8Following the Shapley decomposition approach, GDP p.c. can be defined as a function of labour productivity,
the employment rate, and a demographic component (working-age population rate): output
overall population
= output
workers
∗
workers
working−age population ∗ working−age populationoverall population .
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Figure 3: Inequality of demographic indicators, 1952-1990
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Sources: Population data is taken from Vitalna Statistika (Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1950-1954)
and Demografska Statistika (Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1955-1989). Labour data is taken from Popis
Stanovništva (Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1948, 1953, 1961, 1971, 1981).
technological catch-up by poor regions.9 Third, within a framework of structural modernisation
with a long tradition in development economics (Lewis, 1954), a country seizes efficiency gains
as it shifts resources from low productivity sectors to high productivity sectors.10 By extension,
the process of regional income convergence is synonymous with the process of convergence in
economic structures (Caselli and Coleman, 2001).
In order to acknowledge the first two predictions on growth and convergence, I adopt standard
growth and development accounting methods. I decompose regional growth trajectories into the
relative contributions of inputs, and the efficiency with which those inputs are used, i.e. TFP. Of
course, I do not use an endogenous growth model per se. A major drawback of standard growth
and development accounting methods is that they are incapable of explaining TFP. Relating the
9The phrase “endogenous growth”, as Romer (1994) states, encapsulates a diverse body of theoretical and
empirical research. The common feature of endogenous growth theory is that it seeks to explain the level and
evolution of TFP among and between countries.
10Within countries, the dynamics of structural change are more complex and more difficult to estimate (Caselli
and Coleman, 2001). Agricultural labour from poor regions might migrate to manufacturing and modern services
in the rich regions.
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empirical findings to the existing literature on Yugoslav macroeconomic history can partially
alleviate this problem.
I assess the contribution of structural modernisation to regional development trajectories by
using the Vollrath (2009) dual economy model. Within a development accounting framework,
Vollrath (2009) divides the economy into two sectors - agriculture and non-agriculture. I modify
his model into a growth accounting exercise to account for the contribution of sectoral input
reallocation to aggregate efficiency and hence economic growth.11 Dividing the economy into
two parts is somewhat superficial. But, in case of Yugoslavia, it is appropriate to focus just
on agriculture and non-agriculture. Agricultural labour formed more than 70 per cent of total
labour in the immediate aftermath of WWII (Popis Stanovništva, Savezni Zavod za Statistiku,
1953).
4.2 Methodology
With the aim of estimating efficiency associated with the sectoral allocation of resources, ag-
gregate labour productivity, YL , is assumed to be derived from agriculture and non-agriculture
(Vollrath, 2009):
Y
L
=
Ya
L
+
Yna
L
(1)
where Ya denotes agricultural output, and Yna denotes non-agricultural output. Since Ya and
Yna are divided by total labour, L , YaL and
Yna
L measure the contribution of agriculture and non-
agriculture to aggregate labour productivity, respectively. Output in each sector is generated by
the following Cobb-Douglas production function:
Ya = AaR
γ
a,tK
β
a (hL)
1−γ−β
a (2)
and:
Yna = AnaK
α
na(hL)
1−α
na (3)
where R is agricultural land, K is physical capital, and h is per capita human capital of the
labour force. The term hL denotes labour augmented by quality (human capital), while A de-
notes efficiency with which inputs are used to produce output (TFP). In agricultural production
function (equation 4), γ is the elasticity of output with respect to land, β is the elasticity of
11Appendix A.3 provides a set of advantages the Vollrath (2009) model provides compared compared to the
existing literature.
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output with respect to physical capital, and 1−γ−β is the is the elasticity of output with respect
to human capital. The agricultural production function is consistent with a long tradition of
modelling agriculture (Hayami and Ruttan, 1970).
The non-agricultural production function in equation 3 matches the standard formulation of
aggregate production function in Hall and Jones (1999). It does not include land. Concerning
output elasticities, α denotes the elasticity of output with respect to physical capital, and 1−α
denotes the elasticity of output with respect to human labour. Both sectors are thus char-
acterised by constant returns to scale because elasticities in each sector must sum to unity.12
Assuming perfectly competitive markets, the elasticity of output with respect to its input is
measured by the share of input compensation in output.
In order to conduct a growth accounting exercise, equation 1 can be rewritten as:
y˙
y
=
y˙a
y
+
y˙na
y
(4)
where a lower case letter denotes a variable expressed in per worker terms, and a dot over a
variable denotes its time derivative.13 Equation 4 defines aggregate labour productivity growth
as the weighted sum of agricultural and non-agricultural labour productivity growth. The exis-
tence of this aggregate production does not depend on the problematic assumption of an optimal
resource allocation within an economy (Banerjee and Duflo, 2005).
To determine the weighted sectoral contribution of inputs and TFP to aggregate labour
productivity growth, take the total differential of production functions in equations 2 and 3, and
divide by Y . Subsequently, the first term on the right-hand side of equation 4 expands into:
y˙a
y
= s
A˙a
Aa
+ ρ
r˙a
r
+ κ
k˙a
k
+ (1− ρ− κ) h˙a
h
(5)
where s is the share of agricultural output in total output, ρ is the share of agricultural land
in total output, κ is the share of physical capital in total output, and 1 − ρ − κ is the share of
human capital in total output. The second term on the right-hand side of equation 4 expands
12The assumption of constant returns to scale is corroborated by empirical research. Boyd (1987) estimates
the Yugoslav agricultural production function. He finds that the elasticity of agricultural output with respect to
each input summed to 0.99. Sapir (1980) estimates the Yugoslav manufacturing production function. He finds
that the elasticity of manufacturing output with respect to each input summed to 1.
13The growth accounting exercise is expressed in terms of continuous time to conduce clarity of exposition by
reducing notational clutter. The actual calculations are performed using a standard translog production function.
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into:
y˙na
y
= (1− s)A˙na
Ana
+ κ
k˙na
k
+ (1− ρ− κ) h˙na
h
(6)
Substituting equations 5 and 6 into equation 4 yields the aggregate production function similar
to Temple (2001):
y˙
y
=
A˙
A
+ ρ
r˙a
r
+ κ
k˙
k
+ (1− ρ− κ) h˙
h
(7)
where:
A˙
A
= s
A˙a
Aa
+ (1− s)A˙na
Ana
(8)
k˙ = k˙a + k˙na (9)
and:
h˙ = h˙a + h˙na (10)
Equation 7 does not explicitly incorporate efficiency gains derived from the reallocation of hu-
man and physical capital to more productive uses. Such efficiency gains are implicitly reflected
in A˙, and form some fraction of aggregate TFP growth. In order to explicitly estimate efficiency
gains associated with the reallocation of inputs, note that first order conditions require identi-
cal marginal products, MP , of inputs, i, employed in each sector (Ngai and Pissarides, 2007;
Herrendorf, Rogerson, and Valentinyi, 2014). However, in a developing country like Yugoslavia
this likely condition did not hold:
MPa,i 6= MPna,i (11)
An economy with a sectoral marginal product gap (equation 11) is characterised by an inefficient
sectoral allocation of inputs. This implies that such an economy is characterised by frictions.
These frictions distort the reallocation of inputs from the less productive sector to s more pro-
ductive sector. In turn, a decrease of these frictions yields aggregate efficiency gains as inputs
move to a more productive use in another sector. An economy can seize these efficiency gains
until the sectoral marginal products are equalised. That is, until MPa,i = MPna,i.
To formalise these ideas, treat any efficiency Z derived from the sectoral allocation of inputs
as as the ratio of actual to potential labour productivity (y∗):
Z =
y
y∗
(12)
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where potential output is a hypothetical output level in the absence of a marginal product gap
(if: MPa,i = MPna,i). Z can be interpreted as measuring the fraction of potential output that an
economy is actually achieving given its factor endowments and sector-specific TFP’s (Vollrath,
2009). An economy will approach its potential output through decreasing the marginal product
gap. At a more technical level, the derivation of potential output involves finding the share of
human and physical capital in agriculture that maximises output. Since the calculus is somewhat
tedious, I report the details in appendix A.3, alongside a set of entailed assumptions.
Upon estimating Z, aggregate TFP, A, can be perceived as a function of efficiency derived
from the sectoral allocation of resources, and other categories of efficiency, AE . Formally, within
a growth perspective, equation 8 can be redefined as:
A˙
A
=
A˙E
AE
+
Z˙
Z
(13)
where the reallocation gain, Z, is measured as a change in the ratio of actual to potential
income. I assume that an improvement in the ratio of actual to potential income leads to a
one-to-one increase in economic growth. Substituting equation 13 into equation 7 yields the
growth accounting exercise of this paper:
y˙
y
=
A˙E
AE
+
Z˙
Z
+ ρ
r˙a
r
+ κ
k˙
k
+ (1− ρ− κ) h˙
h
(14)
where AE is aggregate TFP adjusted for efficiency gains associated with reallocation of physical
and human capital to a more productive use in another sector. It is the TFP growth I report in
section 6.1. It is estimated as residual growth after accounting for the contribution of reallocation
gains and input growth to aggregate labour productivity growth.
5 Data
This section describes data. I primarily rely on official sources, but I make adjustments to official
data where necessary. A more detailed data description is provided in appendix A.1. In order
to minimise measurement problems, the analysis is conducted on the basis of five benchmark
years - 1953, 1961, 1971, 1981 and 1986. The first four are centred on labour data derived from
population censuses. The last year is based on an employment census. I do not use the last
1991 Yugoslav census as it is incomplete for some regions. All monetary figures are converted
14
to 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars.
5.1 Output
Social Product (SP) was the official indicator of output in Yugoslavia. SP is the conceptual
equivalent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The growth rate of SP is however overesti-
mated because of index number problems (Gerschenkron, 1947), distorted prices (Staller, 1986),
hidden inflation (Nove, 1981), and possibly because of firm’s over-reporting of input require-
ments in order to maximise the allocation of resources within a shortage economy (see Ofer
(1987) for an overview). On the other hand, SP growth rates could be partially underestimated
because the rapidly growing non-market services - education, healthcare, culture, and housing
- were excluded from SP. Non-market services were considered to be “non-productive” sectors
which did not contribute to the value-added of a socialist economy.
Due to aforementioned issues, a group of Western scholars estimated the GDP series of
socialist European countries. They did it in a set of publications entitled “Research Project on
National Income in East Central Europe” (Research Project).14 The Research Project estimated
the GDP of Yugoslavia and its sectors. It did not estimate the GDP of Yugoslav regions. Two
issues related to SP mentioned in the above paragraph might distort the level and evolution of
regional inequality.
First, price distortions could matter. Prices of agricultural goods were set below world prices,
while prices of industrial goods were set above world prices. This implies that official data assigns
a greater share of Yugoslav output to the more industrial regions than it corresponded to the
actual state, magnifying the level of regional inequality.
Second, since the MDRs were likely characterised by a larger share of non-market services in
their total output than the LDRs were, the official level of regional inequality might be under-
estimated. The net impact of these two biases on the level of regional inequality is ambiguous.
The impact of these two biases on the evolution of regional inequality is, however, unambiguous.
If the LDRs converged towards the sectoral structure of the MDRs, official data overestimates
the true extent of regional income divergence.15
14Their publications that cover the 1945-1990 period include Alton (1970) and Alton, Badach, Bass, Bakondi,
Brumaru, Bombelles, Lazarcik, and Staller (1992).
15Of course, it could also be the case that other statistical biases distort the evolution of regional inequality.
For instance, official evolution of regional inequality will be distorted if firms in some regions over reported input
requirements to a larger extent than firms in other regions. Unfortunately, it is impossible to speculate about
the significance of such effects in the absence of research.
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Table 1: Compound annual growth rate of real output, 1952-89, in %
Official data Alternative data Ratio of alternative to official data
Yugoslavia 5.11 4.75 0.93
Bosnia-Herzegovina 4.70 4.55 0.97
Croatia 4.95 4.59 0.93
Kosovo 5.17 5.11 0.99
Macedonia 5.38 4.96 0.92
Montenegro 5.06 4.55 0.90
Serbia 5.12 4.68 0.91
Slovenia 5.33 4.97 0.93
Vojvodina 5.65 5.10 0.90
Note: Official data is expressed in 1972 dinars. Alternative data is expressed in 1990 Int.
GK$.
Sources: See appendix A.1.1.
I assess whether price distortions and the excluded non-market services bias relative regional
growth trajectories by re-estimating regional sectoral outputs. I do it in two steps. First, to
eliminate price distortions, I apply international prices to the agricultural and non-agricultural
sectors. In the second step, I estimate the output of non-market services through the size of
regional non-market service wage bills.16 The regional GDPs are anchored by the Yugoslav
aggregate and sectoral output estimated by the Research Project. I thus keep the value of Yu-
goslavia’s aggregate and sector-specific GDP as estimated by the Research Project, but provide
new regional GDPs.
Table 1 compares the official and alternative output growth rates. On average, it seems that
government statisticians overestimated the average annual growth rate of the MDRs (8 per cent
for the average of Croatia, Slovenia and Vojvodina) to a larger extent than the average annual
growth rate of the LDRs (6 per cent for the average of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia,
and Montenegro). However, the dynamics of output growth overestimation are more complex at
the level of individual regions. In sum, it does seem that official data overestimates the extent of
regional income divergence, but to a small and potentially negligible extent. In appendix A.4.4,
I conduct growth and development accounting exercises with official output data. The results
are qualitatively identical to the baseline case where I use the newly constructed output data.
16I estimate the output of non-market services through the factor cost method, which the Research Project
used as well. My methodology is thus internally consistent with that of the Research Project. Note, however, that
I account for only labour cost, but not capital cost. Unfortunately, it is not possible to account for interregional
cross subsidisation and taxation of capital, which would be necessary to do when estimating output at factor
cost.
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5.2 Inputs
I use official data on gross investment.17 But, I exclude a category called “other”. I omit this
category because it includes expenditure on product research and training of personnel, which
is not part of physical capital. Moreover, it includes changes in the value of inventory. This
is problematic because Madžar (1985) reports that value of inventory has been substantially
overestimated during the inflationary environment of the 1970 and the 1980s. The exclusion of
the category “other” decreases total investment by approximately 10 per cent across Yugoslavia
during the 1953-86 period.
Physical capital is composed of four asset categories: residential structures (dwellings), non-
residential structures, equipment, and livestock. Non-agricultural capital includes the first three
assets, while agricultural capital consists of the last three assets. Annual net capital stock is
estimated using the perpetual inventory method with geometric depreciation:
Ki,t = Ki,t−1(1− δi) + Ii,t (15)
where K denotes capital stock in period t of type i. I denotes gross investment and δ denotes
the deprecation rate. Depreciation rate for each asset is taken from Hulten and Wykoff (1981).18
I rely on Vinski (1959) to initialise the 1953 capital stock series by type. After constructing the
time series for each asset type, I sum these into an unweighted aggregate. The capital stock
is therefore not adjusted for quality. In the absence of a capital market, it is not possible to
estimate the returns to capital by type, with which different assets could be otherwise weighted
and adjusted for quality.
The value of agricultural land is initialised through Vinski (1959) as well. The evolution of
agricultural land is projected through the volume of land provided in official statistics.19
Labour data is taken from official sources and is adjusted for hours worked.20 Labour is
17Investicije u Osnovna Sredstva SFR Jugoslavije, Socijalističkih Republika i Socijalističkih Autonomnih Pokra-
jina 1952-1981, u Cenama 1972. (Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1983a) and Investicije (Savezni Zavod za Statis-
tiku, 1982-1989).
18I take an unweighted average of the assets likely to be found within each sector-specific capital input. This
approach yields depreciation rates of 15.1 and 3.7 per cent for non-agricultural machinery and non-residential
structures, respectively. It yields depreciation rates of 17.1 and 2.4 per cent for agricultural machinery and
non-residential structures, respectively. Depreciation rate for residential structures is assumed to be 1.3 per cent
like in Hsieh (2002). In appendix A.4.2 I experiment with alternative depreciation rates. The results remain
qualitatively very similar to the baseline findings in section 6.
19Statistički Godišnjak SFR Jugoslavije (Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1952-1991).
20Headcount of labour is taken from Popis Stanovništva (Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1948, 1953, 1961, 1971,
1981), Statistički Godišnjak SFR Jugoslavije (Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1987), and ILO (online). Average
annual hours worked are derived from Statistički Godišnjak SFR Jugoslavije (Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, various
17
Figure 4: Regional macroeconomic data, 1953-86
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Sources: See text.
augmented by quality through the mincerian approach, following Hall and Jones (1999). Average
years of schooling for sector-specific labour are constructed from official sources.21 Average years
of schooling are turned into mincerian human capital by adjusting for the returns to education
relative to labour without education. Returns to education are assumed to be piecewise linear.
Following Hall and Jones (1999), I assume that the return to education under 4 years of schooling
is 13.4 per cent, between 4 and 8 years of schooling it is 10.1 per cent, and above 8 years of
schooling it is 6.8 per cent.22
Figure 4 reports some of the newly constructed macroeconomic aggregates. It suggests
that LDRs strongly converged towards the physical and human capital intensities of the MDRs
(panels b and c). It seems that their economic structures have strongly converged as well (panel
a). Indeed, figure 5 shows that the CV of the percentage share of non-agricultural employment
in total employment, the capital to labour ratio, and the average years of schooling, has strongly
decreased.
years).
21Popis Stanovništva (Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1948, 1953, 1961, 1971, 1981) and Statistički Godišnjak
SFR Jugoslavije (Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1991).
22I assume that the returns to education are identical in agriculture and non-agriculture. There is remarkably
little evidence on returns to education in agriculture. In appendix A.4.3 I experiment with alternative returns to
years of schooling. The results remain qualitatively very similar to the baseline findings in section 6.
18
Figure 5: CV of regional macroeconomic data, 1953-86
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5.3 Factor shares
The sector-specific income compensation of labour and capital is estimated from the national
accounts.23 I assume that regional factors shares are identical because it is not possible to
estimate factor shares at a regional level.24 In non-agriculture, the estimated average output
share of capital is 0.43. This is similar to the often estimated capital share in socialist countries
for the aggregate economy (Easterly and Fischer, 1995). In agriculture, the estimated average
output share of capital in agriculture is 0.19. Given the data availability of Yugoslav national
accounts, it is not possible to estimate the land share of agricultural output. Instead, I take the
land share from Boyd (1987). He reports that the land share of agricultural output in Yugoslavia
was 0.24. Given these factors shares, the labour share in both sectors is identical (0.57). For
the aggregate economy, factor shares are imputed as the weighted average of the corresponding
factor shares in agricultural and non-agricultural output. Labour share in aggregate output is
thus 0.57, capital share is 0.38, and land share is 0.05. These estimations are very similar to the
aggregate output shares of labour, capital and land Bergson (1961) finds for the Soviet Union.
23Statistički Godišnjak SFR Jugoslavije (Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1952-1991).
24This seems justified. After accounting for income derived from self-employment, Gollin (2002) finds that
labour shares are approximately constant in international cross-section data. Nevertheless, in appendix A.4.1 I
experiment with alternative labour shares. I attach different labour shares to LDRs and the MDRs. The results
remain qualitatively very similar to baseline findings in section 6.
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Figure 6: Sources of cumulative growth, 1953-86, 1953=100
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6 Results
6.1 Growth accounting
Figure 6 depicts the sources of cumulative labour productivity growth over the benchmark of
five years. Table 2 shows the sources of aggregate economic growth in Yugoslavia during the
overall 1953-86 period in greater detail. I ignore the sectoral contribution to aggregate labour
productivity growth because the contribution of agriculture was negligible. According to table
2, of the annual 5 per cent growth in aggregate output for Yugoslavia, the growth in labour
productivity contributed 5.4 per cent. The remainder was due to negative growth of the labour
supply. Within a European post-war perspective, average annual labour productivity growth
rate of 5.4 per cent over more than thirty years is very high (see table 12.7 in Crafts and Toniolo
(2010)).
Table 2 decomposes the sources of labour productivity growth into contributions of physical
and human capital, reallocation gains associated with a more efficient sectoral allocation of
human and physical capital, and TFP. The last column depicts the variance of a variable. A
high variance on a source of growth indicates that a large fraction of differences in growth
performance across regions can be explained by that source of growth.
The main source of growth in all regions, expect in Slovenia and Vojvodina, was physical
capital deepening. As indicated before by figures 4 and 5, the LDRs experienced a much greater
20
Table 2: Sources of growth, 1953-86, in %, average compound annual growth rate
YUG BIH CRO KOS MK ME SRB SLO VOJ σ2
Aggregate output 5.02 4.85 4.82 5.39 5.30 5.25 4.90 5.39 5.19 0.05
Aggregate labour -0.41 -0.49 -0.67 -0.12 -0.15 -0.06 -0.37 0.14 -0.73 0.08
Labour productivity 5.43 5.33 5.49 5.51 5.45 5.31 5.27 5.26 5.92 0.04
Of which:
Physical capital 2.19 2.45 2.11 2.60 2.30 2.53 2.22 1.83 2.24 0.05
Human capital 0.99 1.26 0.92 1.29 1.14 1.10 0.98 0.65 0.81 0.04
Land 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.04 0.00
Reallocation gains 0.48 0.52 0.49 0.26 0.39 0.50 0.49 0.55 -0.01 0.03
TFP 1.73 1.08 1.93 1.34 1.62 1.18 1.56 2.24 2.83 0.31
Percentage of labour productivity growth due to:
Factors of production 59.13 70.11 55.95 70.82 63.10 68.44 61.15 47.05 52.26 66.94
Reallocation gains 8.90 9.70 8.83 4.79 7.22 9.33 9.32 10.38 -0.12 10.89
TFP 31.97 20.19 35.22 24.40 29.68 22.22 29.53 42.57 47.86 84.47
Notes: YU = Yugoslavia, BIH = Bosnia-Herzegovina, CRO = Croatia, KOS = Kosovo, MK = Macedonia,
ME = Montenegro, SRB = Serbia, SLO = Slovenia, VOJ = Vojvodina, and σ2 = variance.
contribution of physical capital to labour productivity growth than the MDRs did, suggesting
that physical capital deepening contributed towards regional convergence.
The accumulation of human capital followed a similar pattern as the accumulation of physical
capital. The expansion of human capital was a significant source of growth across all regions.
Suggestively, it was an important source of labour productivity convergence as well. The highest
annual contribution of human capital deepening to labour productivity growth among the MDRs
was 0.9 per cent in Croatia, while the lowest annual contribution of human capital among the
LDRs was 1.1 per cent in Montenegro. The contribution of land was generally irrelevant. Land
supply was fairly fixed across Yugoslavia.
Reallocation gains were a less important source of growth than human capital, but they
were nevertheless substantial. I am able to eliminate on average one quarter of conventionally
measured TFP growth by accounting for reallocation gains. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia,
Macedonia, Serbia, and Slovenia, reallocation gains significantly boosted labour productivity
growth. It seems that reallocation gains contributed towards labour productivity convergence
as well, but only slightly. On average, annual reallocation gains among the LDRs were 0.42 per
cent, while among the MDRs they were 0.34 per cent.
Finally, the variance of TFP growth rates was big. The variance of TFP growth was highest
among all the sources of growth by a significant margin (last column of table 2). In Slovenia,
TFP was the main source of growth. In all other regions it was of second-order or third-order
importance. The results strongly suggest that differential TFP gains diminished regional labour
productivity convergence. The lowest annual growth rate of TFP among the MDRs was 1.9 per
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cent in Croatia, while the highest annual TFP growth rate among the LDRs was 1.6 per cent in
Macedonia.
Across all regions except Slovenia, the growth of labour productivity growth was mostly
caused by factor accumulation. This mirrors the general finding in the economic growth literature
that most of output growth across countries can be accounted for by input growth (for a literature
survey, see Hsieh and Klenow (2010)). Nevertheless, there was strong regional variation to it.
In Kosovo as a maximum, factor accumulation accounted for 71 per cent of labour productivity
growth. In Slovenia as a minimum, factor accumulation counted for 47 per cent of labour
productivity growth.
6.2 Development Accounting
Since TFP grew faster in the MDRs than in the LDRs, while factors accumulated and reallocated
faster in the LDRs, TFP likely mitigated regional labour productivity convergence. In this
section, I determine the percentage of regional variation in labour productivity levels that can
be explained by TFP. To get a sense of convergence dynamics, I do this over a span of five
benchmark years.
I perform two development accounting exercises. In the first one, I establish a hypothetical
labour productivity level, y∗∗, a region i would have if it had a) Slovenian sector-specific TFP’s
(productivity leader), and b) maximised its labour productivity over the sectoral allocation of
resources. Similar to Caselli (2005) and Vollrath (2009), the development accounting exercise is
conducted as:
Raw TFP = 1− var(ln y
∗∗
i )
var(ln yi)
(16)
where the ratio “raw TFP” estimates how much of the total variation in labour productivity
levels can be accounted by TFP. The higher is the ratio, the higher is the variation in labour
productivity that can be accounted by raw TFP. I call this ratio raw TFP because it incorpo-
rates a subset of income variation caused by a sectoral (mis)allocation of resources. This ratio
corresponds to TFP measure A in section 4.2. The results are presented in column 1 of table 3.
In 1953, raw TFP accounted for 30 per cent of regional variation in labour productivity levels.
The importance of TFP in accounting for regional productivity differentials increased over time.
By 1971, raw TFP accounted for more than 80 per cent of labour productivity variation.
The second development accounting exercise is similar to the first one. However, I subtract
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Table 3: TFP as a source of regional labour productivity level differentials, in %
(1) (2)
Raw TFP Adjusted TFP
1953 30.6 52.1
1961 68.8 67.2
1971 83.4 82.0
1981 84.9 86.1
1986 84.9 89.5
from raw TFP ratio a variation in labour productivity caused by the sectoral allocation of human
and physical capital:
Adjusted TFP = Raw TFP −
(
1− var(ln y
∗
i )
var(ln yi)
)
(17)
where y∗ is potential labour productivity level a region would have if it maximised its labour
productivity over the sectoral allocation of resources, just like in section 4.2. Ratio “adjusted
TFP” corresponds to TFP measure AE in section 4.2, which is TFP after accounting for re-
allocation gains. The result of this development accounting exercise are presented in column
2 of table 3. In 1953, adjusted TFP accounted for 52 per cent of regional variation in labour
productivity levels. This is a larger magnitude compared to results in column 1. This means
that labour productivity inequality would have been higher than in the actual state if all re-
gions maximised labour productivity over their sectoral allocation of resources. Just like for
raw TFP, the importance of adjusted TFP in accounting for regional productivity differentials
substantially increased over time. Adjusted TFP accounted for more than 80 per cent of labour
productivity variation by 1971.
The role of TFP in accounting for income difference across Yugoslavia after the 1950s is much
higher than what cross-country development accounting exercises typically find at a global level.
For example, Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997); Hall and Jones (1999); Caselli (2005) and
Vollrath (2009) find that TFP accounts for about 50 per cent of cross-country income differences.
6.3 Robustness checks
In appendix A.4, I provide a detailed description of the sensitivity of my results to alternative
labour shares, depreciation rates, returns to years of schooling. and data. I design the sensitivity
tests to go against my baseline findings. I design them so as to increase TFP in the LDRs relative
to TFP in the MDRs. Although the exact quantitative significance of TFP in determining the
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sources of growth rates and the variation in labour productivity levels changes, the impact
of TFP under different settings remains qualitatively identical or very similar to the baseline
setting. Under a variety of alternative settings, 1) MDRs experience higher TFP growth rates
than the LDRs, and 2) TFP gradually accounts for a larger fraction of income differences in
Yugoslavia. In appendix A.4, I also provide a detailed description of how some assumptions
affect my results, like constant returns to scale, unit elasticity of substitution between capital
and labour, and other assumptions related to the estimation of reallocation gains. I further
rationalise the justification of these assumptions for Yugoslavia. Deviations from some of these
assumptions would strengthen my baseline findings.
7 Interpretation of results
To summarise the results: regional income divergence in Yugoslavia was caused by the inability
of the LDRs to converge towards the employment rates and TFP levels of the MDRs. This
section provides an interpretation of these findings. I argue that the evolution of TFP and
the employment rate was intrinsically linked. These two factors in the LDRs were retarded
by a single underlying problem: a capital intensity bias inherent to the governing objective of
labour-managed firms.
7.1 Capital intensity bias
Ward (1958); Vanek (1970) and Meade (1972) argue that labour-managed firms maximised
income per worker. That objective was achieved in two complementary ways. First, work
councils of labour-managed firms were incentivised to accumulate capital in an environment
characterised by a low rental rate of capital. Capital accumulation, facilitated by cheap capital,
caused income generation. It therefore led to a larger income for the members of labour-managed
firms.
Three factors decreased the rental rate of capital, stimulating capital accumulation. First,
the cost of capital was decreased through setting interest rates to very low or even negative
levels (Horvat, 1971; Uvalić, 1992). Second, and related to the previous point, labour-managed
firms were implicitly subsidised through the redistributive effects of holding financial assets
and liabilities in an inflationary environment. Financial claims were generally not inflation-
indexed, while assets generally were (Kraft and Vodopivec, 1992), boosting the equity position
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of companies. Third, the state revenue structure relied on labour income taxation that decreased
the cost of capital relative to the cost of labour (Bateman, Nishimizu, and Page, 1988).
Work councils also maximised income per worker by restricting labour entry. They thereby
increased average incomes of the firms existing members due to declining marginal product
of labour. Through expanding capital and restricting labour entry labour-managed firms thus
substituted capital for labour (Vanek, 1977; Sapir, 1980). Given that workers were appropriating
capital income (Vanek and Jovičić, 1975), a logical consequence of income maximisation would
be the existence of large disparities in income levels of workers with similar characteristics among
firms that differed in their capital to labour ratios. Indeed, these disparities are well documented
(Estrin, 1991).
The capital intensity bias was intensified in the LDRs through four means. First, the regional
development policy consisted of capital aid. Capital aid made capital less scarce than otherwise,
further decreasing the cost of capital in the LDRs.
Second, the literature reports that capital aid was primarily channeled into heavy industries
characterised by intrinsically high capital intensities (Lydall, 1989; Dyker, 1990; Lampe, 2000),
magnifying the capital intensity bias within the LDRs.25 Dyker (1990) argues that that political
structures in the poorer regions were acutely aﬄicted by the “investment good fetishism” - a
tendency to envisage economic development in terms of spectacular capital intensive projects
(e.g. steelworks). Alternatively, but not mutually exclusive, political structures in the LDRs
perhaps attempted to develop high-margin heavy industries for rent-extraction purposes, just
like Young (2000) argues is the case with regional political elites in China.
Third, irrespective of capital aid, Kraft and Vodopivec (1992) find that LDRs received more
(quasi) subsidies than the MDRs concerning capital accumulation. The most important subsidy
took the form of gains on money - repayment of liabilities at negative real interest rates.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the substitution of capital for labour was particularly
anomalous in the LDRs because they were characterised by a relative abundance of labour. As
shown by panel a in figure 4, the LDRs were characterised by very high agricultural employment
shares, and potentially surplus labour. Furthermore, the LDRs were characterised by much
higher unemployment rates than the MDRs were. For example, from the mid-1960s, the unem-
ployment rate in Kosovo was higher than 20 per cent, while the unemployment rate in Slovenia
ranged between 1 to 4 per cent.26
25As anecdotal evidence, see the case study of Kosovo’s Trepča mining enterprise in Palairet (2003).
26Jugoslavija 1918-1988: Statistički Godišnjak (Savezni Zavod za Statistiku (1989)). Of course, high unem-
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7.2 Hypothesised impact on employment and TFP
How is the capital intensity bias related to the regional divergence in employment rates and
TFP? The hypothesised impact on employment is clear-cut. Labour-managed firms maximised
income per worker through substituting capital for labour. This particularly retarded employ-
ment rates in the LDRs (figure 3) because the capital intensity bias was stronger there. The
hypothesised impact of the capital intensity bias on TFP is slightly more subtle. It had a two-
fold impact. Both impacts are extended effects of the impact of the capital intensity bias on the
employment rate.
First, the capital intensity bias likely caused a low and possibly declining labour utilisation
rate. If not accounted for, utilisation rate is reflected in TFP (Burnside, Eichenbaum, and
Rebelo, 1993; Paquet and Robidoux, 2001). Low labour utilisation rate seems pernicious in so-
cialist economies because they were characterised by disguised unemployment. While Yugoslavia
is unique among the socialist economies in the sense it was characterised by open unemployment,
disguised unemployment was still an acute issue (Mencinger, 1988). This is derived from the
nature of a labour-managed economy. Labour held to an extent traditional managerial preroga-
tives. When faced with cost-cutting requirements, workers were presumably reluctant to dismiss
themselves or their colleagues.
It is impossible to directly observe labour utilisation rate, particularly real effort. As such,
existing (business cycle) research typically measures labour utilisation by dividing labour by
the working-age population (Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo, 1993). I follow the example in
figure 7. The figure suggests that labour utilisation rate has consistently decreased across the
regions (panel a). However, labour utilisation rate has decreased more in the LDRs (reflected
in increasing CV in panel b of figure 7), suggesting that the LDRs suffered more from declining
labour utilisation than the MDRs did. By extension, the evolution of TFP in the LDRs was
retarded relative to the evolution of TFP among the MDRs.
Second, the capital intensity was debilitating in the LDRs because they were characterised
by labour abundance. Capital intensity bias skewed production away from the usage of the
relatively abundant factor of production, i.e. labour. This likely caused inefficiency in the
LDRs, which should be reflected in the divergence of regional TFPs.
Is the hypothesised relationship between the capital intensity bias, employment rate, and
ployment rates in the LDRs are themselves supportive of the hypothesis that the LDRs were particularly aﬄicted
by the capital intensity bias.
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Figure 7: Labour to the working-age population ratio, 1953-86
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Panel b: Coefficient of variation of labour to the working-age population ratio
Notes: Labour is total hours worked. As in business cycle research, annual labour (total hours worked) is
de-trended by 3600 hours. People spend a portion of time satisfying biological necessities (like sleeping),
and can not work. Otherwise, panel b is similar to figure 3.
TFP, explicitly visible in the data? MPK should encapsulate these relationships. It may seem
obvious that regional MPKs must have strongly converged given the strong convergence in
capital to labour ratios. However, as Lucas (1990) points in a seminal article, poor regions
might have lower endowments of factors complementary to physical capital and lower TFP.27
Strong convergence in capital to labour ratios might thus coexist with large differences in the
MPK. This implies that inputs are inefficiently used (Caselli and Feyrer, 2007).
In particular, if the capital intensity bias retarded the evolution of employment rate and
TFP in the LDRs relative to the MDRs, one would expect that the LDRs had a lower MPK
than the MDRs did in non-agriculture, but not necessarily in agriculture. Non-agriculture
was characterised by a much larger fraction of labour-managed firms than agriculture was.
Agriculture largely consisted of private, profit-maximising, firms, unaffected by the capital-
intensity bias.
27Lucas (1990) also lays out the option that international capital markets are distorted, mitigating the flow
of capital from rich to poor countries. In Yugoslavia, labour-managed firms, next to other factors, distorted the
capital market. Capital market did not exist in a meaningful sense. If capital market operated in Yugoslavia,
capital would have flown from poor to rich regions, given that the richer regions were typically characterised by
a higher MPK (figure 8). The experience of Yugoslavia can be perceived as a twist to the proposition of Lucas
(1990).
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Figure 8: Evolution of MPK, 1953-86
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Indeed, perversely enough, panel b in figure 8 shows that since 1961 non-agricultural MPK
among the MDRs was systematically higher than non-agricultural MPK among the LDRs. Re-
gional differences in the evolution of non-agricultural MPK are striking. Among the MDRs,
non-agricultural MPK has increased over the whole sample period, while non-agricultural MPK
among the LDRs has decreased over the whole sample. In agriculture, the trends are different.
As one would normally expect, the poorer regions had a higher level of MPK than the richer
regions (Slovenia and Vojvodina), with the notable exception of Croatia.
Furthermore, table 4 demonstrates that there is no evidence of a negative correlation between
labour productivity and the MPK in non-agriculture. The correlations are, perversely, positive,
indicating gross inefficiency in the LDRs.28 Furthermore, the correlations have increased over
time (implied by figure 8). In agriculture, where labour-managed firms were not as concentrated,
the correlations are negative as one would normally expect given the predictions of the Solow
growth model.
In the long-run, such perverse relationships would diminish or disappear. Labour would
move to firms, or establish firms, where it could realise a higher marginal product, arbitraging
productivity differentials. Alternatively, labour could move to regions where it could realise a
higher marginal product, diminishing productivity differentials. These forces are conditional on
free entry of labour into existing firms, free establishment of new firms, and interregional labour
28Similar to physical capital, there was a strong positive correlation between the marginal product of human
capital and labour productivity. Over the set of five benchmark years, the correlation was larger than 0.9.
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Table 4: Correlation between labour productivity and the marginal product of physical capital
(MPK), 1953-86
Non-agriculture Agriculture
1953 0.66 -0.51
1961 0.72 -0.91
1971 0.79 -0.70
1981 0.91 -0.73
1986 0.87 -0.56
mobility. All three conditions did not hold in Yugoslavia.29
Entry of workers into firms was not free. Existing workers of labour-managed firms were dis-
couraged from employing new workers. They would have to share income within a larger group,
diluting their wages due to declining marginal product of labour. This behaviour resembles
insider-outsider models of labour markets characterised by strong trade unions.
The tendency of labour-managed firms to restrict employment is theoretically well grounded
(Ward, 1958; Meade, 1972). Free establishment of firms could have alleviated this distortion.
Entry of firms was not free though. Local government decided whether to allow an establishment
of a firm within its administrative boundaries (Horvat, 1971). Furthermore, labour had poor
incentive to create new firms since these had to be socially owned Estrin (1991).
Yugoslav interregional migration was low compared to the OECD countries (5). Low interre-
gional labour mobility was caused by three factors. First, low interregional labour mobility was,
of course, itself a symptom of intrinsic barriers to new labour entry into existing labour-managed
firms.
Second, the incentive to migrate from poorer to richer regions was additionally distorted be-
cause the interregional differences in wages were compressed for egalitarian reasons, and there-
fore did not fully reflect interregional differences in productivity. Given their marginal products,
labour in the LDRs earned higher wages than labour in the MDRs, distorting their incentive to
move to richer regions and thus arbitrage productivity differentials. Figure 9 demonstrates this.
Labour in all regions earned lower wages than labour in Slovenia, the productivity leader (panel
a of figure 9). However, regional differences in the wage rate should have been higher given the
regional differences in the marginal product of human capital (MPH). Panel b in figure 9 shows
that the return to human capital was typically more detached from its marginal product in the
LDRs than it was in the MDRs. That is, labour augmented by quality earned a wage that was
29Of course, capital could have arbitraged productivity differentials, too. But, private interregional capital
flows were effectively banned for reasons espoused in section 2.
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Table 5: Interregional migration in Yu-
goslavia and a selected group of OECD
countries (migrants as percent of total
population)
Yugoslavia (1989) 0.25
Bosnia-Herzegovina 0.5
Croatia 0.17
Kosovo 0.19
Macedonia 0.12
Montenegro 0.43
Slovenia 0.18
Vojvodina 0.26
Selected OECD countries (1987) 2
Australia 1.6
Canada 1.5
Finland 1.6
France 1.3
Germany 1.1
Italy 0.5
Japan 2.6
Norway 2.6
Sweden 3.9
United States 2.8
Notes: Serbia is not reported in the used
source. OECD average is unweighted.
Source: Cviki, Kraft, and Vodopivec
(1993).
higher than implied by its marginal product in all regions, but typically more so in the LDRs.
Moreover, it seems that the incentive to migrate from poorer to richer regions has deteriorated
over time. This is implied by panel c in figure 9; the wage rate to MPH ratio has typically
increased in the LDRs relative to the same ratio in Slovenia until 1981.
Third, with the elimination of travel restrictions during the mid-1960s, approximately 10 per
cent of the Yugoslav labour force migrated to Western Europe - primarily to (western) Germany
as “guest workers” (Lampe, 2000). Arguably, when faced with a choice of whether to migrate to
Yugoslav another region or another Western European country, a prospective Yugoslav migrant
opted for the latter. She could seize higher pecuniary benefits abroad. Strong cultural differences
among the Yugoslav regions certainly lowered the relative physic costs of migrating to another
western European country, as opposed to migrating to another Yugoslav region.
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Figure 9: Wage rate and the marginal product of human capital (MPH), 1953-86
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Notes: Wage rate is hourly wage. Human capital is labour augmented by quality.
8 Conclusion
Yugoslavia is often perceived as a unique success story among the socialist economies, exhibiting
rapid catch-up growth until the late 1970s (Balassa and Bertrand, 1970; Sapir, 1980). But, very
little is known about economic development at the regional level both within Yugoslavia and in
socialist Europe at large. This paper fills an important gap in the literature on post-war growth in
Europe with a detailed quantitative study of regional patterns of growth in Yugoslavia, probably
the most heterogeneous country in Europe during the 20th century, besides the Soviet Union.
The falling behind of the least developed regions of Yugoslavia was caused by their inability
to converge towards the TFP levels and employment rates of the more developed regions. I
interpret these failures as symptoms of a single underlying problem: a capital intensity bias
inherent to the governing objective of the labour-managed firms.
Responsibility over regional development was devolved to the regions. Further down the
aggregation level, control over production, marketing, and investment, was devolved to the
labour-managed firms. Socialist Yugoslavia moved from having one central plan, to having
many mutually competitive plans. While on aggregate this may have created a net positive
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productivity outcome, witnessed by Yugoslavia’s impressive productivity performance compared
to other socialist economies, it created unique distortions. The decentralisation policies were
implemented with the aim of stimulating regional equalisation of incomes and maintaining social
stability. They led, however, to exactly opposite outcomes.
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A Appendix
A.1 Data
A.1.1 Output
SP is the conceptual equivalent of GDP in the sense that SP, just like GDP, measures the
value of all final goods produced domestically. SP and GDP are, however, calculated differ-
ently and yield different levels of output. Even though they are conceptual equivalents, they
are only approximately comparable. SP was calculated only for the “productive sector”. The
“non-productive sector” that was excluded from SP consisted of a section of services, primarily
non-market services - government administration, defence, healthcare, education, culture, and
housing.
Over time, productive segments of the non-productive sector were incorporated into the SP.
For example, publishing activity which was part of the education sector was added to the SP.
However, the Yugoslav statistical bureau, Savezni Zavod za Statistiku (SZS), did not estimate
the output of such (minor) sub-sectors for the whole period. In effect, when SZS expanded
coverage of the SP, it concluded that all of the newly discovered value-added occurred in the
year in which the new sub-sector was incorporated into the SP, magnifying the growth rate of
output rate at the moment of inclusion of a new sub-sector.
A more troublesome feature of the Yugoslav version of national accounts is its inconsistency
in the application of the Material Planning System, the socialist equivalent of the System of
National Accounts. In Yugoslavia, as in all internally consistent national accounts, the reported
output by value-added and the reported output by expenditure yield the same level. But,
on closer inspection, it is conceptually impossible that the two would yield the same level of
output. Output by value-added excluded the non-productive sector, while output by expenditure
included gross investment incurred in the non-productive sector.
Furthermore, SP was calculated by subtracting from gross production of the productive
sector only the “material” or “productive” costs, including depreciation, while the inputs from the
excluded service sectors were not subtracted. So, as Alton, Badach, Bass, Bakondi, Brumaru,
Bombelles, Lazarcik, and Staller (1992) (pp. 6-7) argue, SP was not a “clean” value-added
measure.
On net, the aforementioned statistical peculiarities of SP yield a lower level of output than
GDP. Miljković (1992), working within SZS on Yugoslavia’s internationally comparable GDP
during 1985-1991 as part of the European Comparison Programme funded by the UN and the
World Bank, provides the most systematic quantitative comparison between GDP and SP levels.
For the 1985 benchmark year, he finds that SP provides a 11.6 per cent lower level of output
than GDP.
Irrespective of SP underestimating the level of output, Yugoslavia was alongside other social-
ist countries criticised by Western scholars that it overestimated the growth rate of output (see
Ofer (1987) for a literature survey). To elaborate some of the issues reported in section 5, SZS,
for instance, used the Paasche index to deflate industrial production. Staller (1986) argues that
this index underestimates inflation in Yugoslavia, hence overestimating real economic growth.
He reports that SZS, upon introducing new or changed products into the index of industrial
production, used prices prevailing in the second year of production which still reflected costs
of development. As such products were typically rapidly growing, the greater weight they were
assigned by prices of the initial period inflated the growth rate of total industrial production.
Socialist countries also distorted the value of industrial and agricultural production. Prices
were distorted by setting the prices of industrial goods above world prices, while prices of agri-
cultural goods were set below world prices. The intention of socialist planners was to change the
terms of trade between the two sectors which would be conducive to the development of industry.
This development strategy was formulated in the early years of the Soviet Union by Yevgeni
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Preobrazhensky. It was based on the concept of “primitive socialist accumulation”. Primitive
socialist accumulation creates three statistical biases. First, economic growth is overestimated
since the rapidly growing manufacturing output is assigned a greater share in total output than
it corresponds to the actual state. Second, price distortions overestimate the marginal product of
industry and underestimate the marginal product of agriculture. By extension, price distortions
also overestimate the efficiency gains associated with structural modernisation as estimated in
this paper. Finally, as discussed in section 5, price distortions bias the evolution of regional
inequality. The final issue was explicitly recognised by Yugoslav statisticians. In 1954, in SZS’s
Metodološki Materijali, Broj 61: Metodologija za Obračun Narodnog Dohotka (Savezni Zavod za
Statistiku (1955), pp. 22-23) (methodological materials), the head of SZS wrote:
“As a consequence of a certain economic policy, prices of our industrial goods are above global
market prices, and prices of agricultural goods are below this average... We cannot know the true
contribution of industry and agriculture to income of the country, as long as we do not eliminate
differences in levels of prices... this is inevitably reflected in income of each republic, due to
differences in their economic structures. Industrially more developed republics are contributing
to the income of the country with a greater share than it corresponds to the actual state.”30
The most recent rendition of the Maddison Project in Bolt and van Zanden (2014) includes
the GDP series of Yugoslav successor states made by Branko Milanović. His aim was to produce
internationally comparable long-run GDP levels of the successor states of Yugoslavia. He has
used the World Bank’s GDP estimate of Slovenia in 1990 as an anchor to estimate the GDP
of the other Yugoslav regions. He has anchored Yugoslav regions around the Slovenian 1990
GDP level by their 1990 income differences estimated by the SZS. Subsequently, he has pro-
jected their historical growth rates using official data (information obtained through personal
correspondence). Thus, even though Milanović has made more realistic output levels of Yu-
goslav regions compared to SZS, regional inequality remains plausibly problematic, and regional
economic growth rates remain overestimated.
As such, I re-estimate the GDP series of Yugoslav regions. As mentioned in section 5, official
data might bias the level and evolution of regional income inequality through price distortions
and through excluding non-market services from the estimate of output. I eliminate these two
possible distortions in two steps.
In the first step, I apply international prices to the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors
of Yugoslav regions. I therefore eliminate price distortions that might bias the level and evolution
of regional income inequality. More formally, I multiply the official share of a region’s sectoral
SP in the total sectoral SP by the total sectoral GDP estimated by the Research Project.31
Thus:
Yi = YY UG,A,RP ∗ Yi,A,SZS
YY UG,A,SZS
+ YY UG,NA,RP ∗ Yi,NA,SZS
YY UG,NA,SZS
(18)
where aggregate output (Y ) of region i is a sum of output derived from agriculture (A) and
non-agriculture (NA).32 Subscripts SZS and RP denote sources of data. RP means that data
is taken from the Research Project. SZS denotes official data. In equation 18, I assume that a
region’s share in the total A and NA SP is the same as its share in the total Yugoslav (Y UG) A
and NA GDP. Since I anchor regional A and NA output by the A and NA GDP of Yugoslavia
estimated by the Research Project, I allow each region a different size of A and NA output com-
pared to official data. But, I keep the share of each region in the A and NA output of Yugoslavia
30Translated by the author.
31Official output data is taken from Jugoslavija 1918-1988: Statistički Godišnjak (Savezni Zavod za Statistiku,
1989) and Statistički Godišnjak SFR Jugoslavije (Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1991)). Alternative aggregate
GDP of Yugoslavia is taken from Maddison (online). He has used the the Research Project’s GDP estimates of
Yugoslavia, and expressed them in 1990 Int. GK$. Alternative Yugoslav GDP sectoral data is taken from the
publications of the Research Project, because they are not reported by Maddison (online) - Alton (1970) and
Alton, Badach, Bass, Bakondi, Brumaru, Bombelles, Lazarcik, and Staller (1992).
32To reduce notational clutter, I ignore a subscript for time.
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identical to official data. In other words, I keep the value of Yugoslavia’s aggregate and sector-
specific GDP as estimated by the Research Project, but provide new regional GDPs. Since the
Research Project used international prices (US dollars) to estimate the GDP of Yugoslavia’s
agricultural and non-agricultural sector, equation 18 allows me to eliminate price distortions
between agriculture and non-agriculture that might bias regional inequality. By this method,
however, I can not eliminate price distortions operating within agriculture and non-agriculture,
if they were present. I can only eliminate price distortions between broadly conceived agriculture
and non-agriculture.
In the second step, I eliminate possible distortions caused by the non-market services that
were excluded from the SP. The MDRs were likely characterised by a larger share of non-market
services in the their NA output than the LDRs were, which SZS does not account for. In
other words, a region’s share in the total NA SP was certainly not the same as its share in the
total NA GDP. In the second step, I adjust for non-market services by dividing NA into two
parts - the productive (PNA) and the non-productive (NPNA) part (non-market services) of
non-agriculture. For PNA, just like in the first step, I multiply the official share of a region’s
PNA SP in the total PNA SP by the total PNA GDP of Yugoslavia estimated by the Research
Project. Like in the first step, I assume that a region’s share in the productive part of the
non-agricultural SP is the same as its share in the total productive part of non-agricultural
GDP.
For the non-productive sector, or non-market services, I take a different approach. I impute
regional NPNA GDP levels through factor cost. This is consistent with the methodology of the
Research Project. The Research Project used the method of Bergson (1953) to estimate Soviet
national income at factor cost. They relied on official sectoral volumes of factors of production
that they transformed into sectoral GDP by estimating the returns to factors of production.
More explicitly, I estimate the share of a region’s NPNA wage bill (W ) in the total NPNA
wage bill. Then, I multiply the share of a region’s NPNA wage bill (W ) in the total NPNA
wage bill by the Yugoslav NPNA GDP estimated by the Research Project. Thus, I decompose
the second term in equation 18 as follows:
YY UG,NA,RP ∗ Yi,NA,SZS
YY UG,NA,SZS
= YY UG,PNA,RP ∗ Yi,PNA,SZS
YY UG,PNA,SZS
+YY UG,NPNA,RP ∗ Wi,NPNA,SZS
WY UG,NPNA,SZS
(19)
Note that I do not adjust for capital income. It is impossible to estimate capital returns by
region. Importantly, it is not possible to estimate the imputed rent of housing, which is by
far the most significant category of the aggregate capital stock of non-market services. Most
importantly, it is not possible to account for cross-regional subsidisation of capital.
Estimating GDP through factor cost involves adding taxes and subtracting subsidies. This
can be difficult to do at a regional level. In case of Yugoslavia, the workers in the MDRs were
subsidising the wages of workers in the LDRs. The Federal Fund that channeled capital to the
LDRs was financed through taxing the income of firms in the MDRs. This is reflected in the
wages of workers employed in the labour-managed firms. Vanek and Jovičić (1975) argue that
workers of labour-managed firms were appropriating capital income. By extension, workers in
the LDRs appropriated more capital income than they would have been able in the absence
of capital transfers, given their marginal products. If interregional taxation and subsidisation
is unaccounted for, GDP measured through factor cost will underestimate the output levels of
MDRs. I attempt to account for interregional taxation and subsidisation by using 1990 wage
data.33 By 1990, the Yugoslav market disintegrated (Lampe, 2000). The MDRs stopped paying
taxes to the federation, and the Federal Fund dissolved. By extension, the workers in the
MDRs stopped subsidising the workers in the LDRs, and the relative wages of workers in the
LDRs strongly decreased. Thus, 1990 wages should reflect implicit interregional taxation and
33Statistički Godišnjak SFR Jugoslavije (Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1991)
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Table 6: Compound annual growth rate of real output, 1952-89, in %
Official
Alternative data, accounting for:
Price distortions Price distortions and non-market services
Alternative Comparison, fraction Alternative Comparison, fraction
Yugoslavia 5.11 4.75 0.93 4.75 0.93
Bosnia-Herzegovina 4.70 4.33 0.92 4.55 0.97
Croatia 4.95 4.58 0.92 4.59 0.93
Kosovo 5.17 4.84 0.94 5.11 0.99
Macedonia 5.38 5.03 0.94 4.96 0.92
Montenegro 5.06 4.71 0.93 4.55 0.90
Serbia 5.12 4.76 0.93 4.68 0.91
Slovenia 5.33 4.94 0.93 4.97 0.93
Vojvodina 5.65 5.32 0.94 5.10 0.90
Note: Official data is expressed in 1972 dinars. Alternative data is expressed in 1990 Int. GK$.
Sources: See text.
subsidisation. Alternatively, 1990 wages should at least reflect to a larger extent implicit taxes
and subsidies than wages in the earlier years. For example, the ratio of the average Slovenian
wage rate in non-market services to the average Kosovar wage rate in non-market services in
1990 was 2.6, while in 1972 for example, the same ratio was 1.5 (Statistički Godišnjak SFR
Jugoslavije (Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1991)).
To finalise this section, I estimate regional GDPs through substituting equation 19 into
equation 18:
Yi = YY UG,A,RP ∗ Yi,A,SZS
YY UG,A,SZS
+YY UG,PNA,RP ∗ Yi,PNA,SZS
YY UG,PNA,SZS
+YY UG,NPNA,RP ∗ Wi,NPNA,SZS
WY UG,NPNA,SZS
(20)
Table 6 presents the results. Column 2 presents the results of step 1 (equation 18), that is,
if I eliminate price distortions between agriculture and non-agriculture, but do not adjust for
non-market services. This exercise decreases GDP growth across Yugoslav regions by a very
similar magnitude compared to official estimates (column 3 of table 6). Thus, price distortions
do not seem to distort official regional inequality trends significantly.34 This might be explained
by the 1972 prices that government statisticians used to estimate historic real output growth
rates.35 By 1972 the most egregious price distortions were eliminated. Prices were substantially
liberalised during the mid 1960s as a requirement for Yugoslavia’s 1966 accession into the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Horvat, 1971). When I estimate GDP through equation 20,
where I adjust for both price distortions and non-market services, which is the final data I use,
then the difference in the decrease of average output growth rate across the regions is larger
(final column of table 6). It thus appears that exclusion of non-market services from SP is more
problematic than price distortions concerning the evolution of regional inequality as estimated
by the SZS.
A.1.2 Inputs
The data on gross investment is the most problematic among the data series required for the
analysis. Similar to output, gross investment was likely overestimated because of index number
problems, price distortions, and perhaps because of outright fabrication from enterprises. While
34I can not isolate through equation 18 the impact of price distortions on relative regional growth trajectories
from other biases related to SP, like official indexes overestimating economic growth. Such impacts are reflected
jointly with price distortions in column 2 of table 6. In effect, by equation 18, I assume that, index number
problems for example, impacted all Yugoslav regions identically, inflating regional growth rates by the same
extent.
35SZS used 1972 prices until the end of Yugoslavia to project the real evolution of economic data, like GDP,
investment, and consumption.
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alternative output series have been produced in response to the criticism of official series, there
are no existing alternative investment series for Yugoslavia. As such, I embrace official data
on investment. But, I make an important adjustment using their own data. As mentioned in
section 5, I deduct the gross investment category “other” from total gross investment.
Aggregate physical capital consists of four asset types: residential structures (dwellings),
non-residential structures, equipment, and livestock. Non-agricultural capital stock consists of
the first three asset types, while agricultural capital stock consists of the last three asset types.
I rely on Vinski (1959) to initialise sector-specific asset type. Vinski (1959) relies on an official
survey of physical capital stock conducted in 1953 for the productive sector. The contribution
of Vinski (1959) lies in estimating the value of dwellings and fixed capital of the non-productive
sector (e.g. education, healthcare and culture). Moreover, he has estimated the value of capital
stock in private agriculture and in public transport, which the official wealth survey did not
cover. For the subsectors of non-agriculture however, Vinski (1959) typically does not offer
estimates for each asset type. For example, for manufacturing, he reports the overall value of
capital, but does not report the share of equipment and the share of structures in the total value
of capital. To impute the value of each asset type in the non-agricultural sector, I multiply the
official share of equipment and structures in the total value of capital by the total amount of
capital in Vinski (1959).36 I do this for the value of equipment and non-residential structures
only, because Vinski (1959) provides the value of residential structures.
Except for livestock, capital stock categories are extended for the remaining years of the
analysis via the perpetual inventory method. I extend the 1953 Vinski (1959) estimate of live-
stock value by the volume of livestock provided in the Statistički Godišnjak SFR Jugoslavije
(Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1954, 1962, 1972, 1983, 1987). Following international account-
ing standards, livestock that forms agricultural capital consists of cattle that is not used for
slaughter, e.g. for draught power and breeding.
Upon estimating individual time-series of various asset types, I sum them into a single capital
stock series. I do this because it is not possible to estimate the share of capital subinputs in
output.
Table 7 presents the newly estimated aggregate capital stock series in Yugoslavia. It reveals
a significantly higher growth rate of physical capital stock in the LDRs than in the MDRs.
Compared to the official data, the growth rate of physical capital is on average 1.4 percentage
points lower per annum between 1953 and 1986. There are, however, significant differences
among the regions.
The large difference between the official and alternative capital stock growth can be at-
tributed to at least three factors. First, I exclude the gross investment category “other”. Second,
the coverage of my capital stock data is significantly wider. I include the value of fixed capital
of non-market services, public transport, private agriculture and livestock, which the official
data does not include. Third, official data measures the gross value of physical capital, while I
measure the net value of physical capital.
Agricultural land consists of land used for cultivation of crops, grazing, and forestry. Fol-
lowing international accounting standards, agricultural land excludes assets whose growth is the
result of human cultivation, such as orchards, vineyards and timber. I include such assets in
non-residential structures. To initialise the value of land, I again rely on Vinski (1959). He
estimates the value of agricultural land in 1953 by capitalising land rent. In earlier work, Vinski
(1957) estimated the value of agricultural land by prices of freely exchanged land. For Yugoslavia
as a whole, Vinski (1959) reports that capitalising land rent yields a 5 per cent higher value of
agricultural land than by estimating it through the prices of freely exchanged land. I use his
more recent work (Vinski, 1959) because there he estimates the value of agricultural land at a
36Official data is taken from Osnovna Sredstva Privrede Društvenog Sektora SFR Jugoslavije, Socijalističkih
Republika i Socijalističkih Autonomnih Pokrajina, 1952-1981, u cenama 1972 (Savezni Zavod za Statistiku,
1983b).
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Table 7: Compound annual growth rate of real capital stock, 1953-86,
in %
Official data Alternative data Difference
Yugoslavia 6.21 4.81 -1.40
Bosnia-Herzegovina 6.51 5.35 -1.17
Croatia 5.96 4.39 -1.57
Kosovo 7.62 6.02 -1.59
Macedonia 7.11 5.30 -1.81
Montenegro 9.76 5.92 -3.84
Serbia 5.96 4.91 -1.04
Slovenia 5.73 4.45 -1.29
Vojvodina 6.54 4.64 -1.90
Notes: Official data is denoted in 1972 prices. Alternative data is
expressed in 1990 Int. GK$.
Sources: Official data is taken from Statistički Godišnjak SFR Ju-
goslavije (Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1991). See text for the alter-
native data.
regional level. In earlier work, Vinski (1957) estimated the value of agricultural land only for
Yugoslavia as a whole.
As mentioned in the main text, I extend the Vinski (1959) estimate of the value of agricultural
land for the remaining years of the analysis by the evolution of the volume of agricultural land
available in official sources.
Moving to labour data, the 1986 headcount of agricultural labour working in private ca-
pacity is not reported in official publications. I estimate agricultural labour through a linear
interpolation between the 1981 and 1991 census years.
I adjust labour for hours worked. I take effective hours worked which exclude sick leave, vaca-
tion leave and maternal leave, but include overtime and similar categories. For non-agriculture,
effective hours worked are taken from SZS as reported in section 5. Average hours worked are
reported only for Yugoslavia. They are not reported for regions. I estimate regional average
hours worked in non-agriculture by their industrial composition. That is, I multiply the ratio of
industry-specific regional labour to total regional labour by the industry-specific hours worked
in Yugoslavia on average. I then take the summation of this exercise to impute the regional
hours worked in non-agriculture. Hours worked in private agriculture are not reported in official
publications. I derive these from the work of Gollin, Lagakos, and Waugh (2014). They find
that, on an average global scale, agricultural workers tend to work 10 per cent less hours per
annum than non-agricultural workers. I assume the same was the case in Yugoslavia.
Table 8 reports labour growth in Yugoslavia. Given the negative expansion of labour, the
data implies that labour productivity in Yugoslavia grew faster than aggregate output. This
stands in conflict with the common claim that socialist growth was driven by the expansion of
capital and labour (Krugman, 1994). Labour input was at best stagnant because of two reasons.
First, between 1953 and 1986, the amount of yearly hours an average labourer spent working
decreased by approximately 25 per cent. Second, as further elaborated in section 7, a significant
fraction of Yugoslav labour moved to Western Europe in search for higher wages, draining the
domestic supply of labour.
Average years of schooling that agricultural labour obtained by 1981 and 1986 is not reported
in official publications. I estimate average years of schooling of agricultural labour for these two
years by assuming that agricultural labour continued converging, but at a linearly decreasing
rate, towards the educational attainment of non-agricultural labour. In 1953, average agricul-
tural labourer attained 60 per cent less years of education than an average non-agricultural
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Table 8: Growth of labour, 1953-1986, 1953=100
Headcount Total hours worked
Yugoslavia 106.1 86.9
Bosnia-Herzegovina 102.9 85.1
Croatia 97.2 80.0
Kosovo 117.6 96.1
Macedonia 116.3 95.4
Montenegro 117.5 98.2
Serbia 108.7 88.4
Slovenia 128.1 104.5
Vojvodina 96.6 78.4
Sources: See text.
labourer. By 1971, the gap decreased to 52 per cent. I assume that by 1986 the average sec-
toral gap in educational attainment decreased further to 46 per cent. I estimate these gaps at a
region-specific level.
A.1.3 Factor shares
For the purpose of measuring income shares, value added is measured from the perspective of the
producer. This involves removing indirect taxes on the value of output (e.g. sales taxes). Labour
compensation includes all wages, salaries, supplements and employer contributions towards social
insurance. Agricultural labour compensation also includes the value of natural consumption, i.e.
the value of agricultural products produced and consumed at farm. Assuming constant returns
to scale, capital share in non-agriculture is calculated as one minus the estimated labour share.
In agriculture, capital share is estimated as one minus the estimated labour and land shares.
As mentioned in section 5, I estimate aggregate factor compensation as a weighted average
of agricultural and non-agricultural factor compensation. Since I find that the labour share in
agriculture and non-agriculture is identical (0.57), aggregate labour share is also the same (0.57).
For capital this is not the case, while land is employed only in agriculture. More formally, I thus
estimate aggregate capital and land share as:
κ = sβ + (1− s)α (21)
ρ = sγ (22)
where, as before, κ is the capital share of aggregate output, β is the capital share of agricultural
output, α is the capital share of non-agricultural output, ρ is the land share of aggregate output,
γ is the land share of agricultural output, and s is agricultural share of aggregate output.
A.2 Regional inequality measures
The Gini coefficient, G, is defined as:
G =
1
y¯
1
n(n− 1)
n∑
i
n∑
j
[yi − yj ] (23)
where yi and yj denote output per capita of observation i and observation j, respectively. n
denotes the amount of observations, and y¯ is the unweighted mean output per capita.
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The coefficient of variation, CV , is defined as:
CV =
σ
µ
(24)
where σ denotes standard deviation, and µ is mean.
The Theil index, T , is defined as:
T =
1
n
n∑
i=1
yi
y¯
ln
(
yi
y¯
)
(25)
where yi denotes output per unit of observation i, y¯ is the unweighted mean output per unit of
n amount of observations.
A.3 Vollrath (2009) dual economy model
A.3.1 Overview and existing literature
The main advantage of the Vollrath (2009) dual economy model is that it explicitly analyses
the marginal product gap between agriculture and non-agriculture. By doing so, the model
acknowledges potential distortions that might hamper the reallocation of resources between
sectors. In turn, elimination of these distortions decreases the sectoral marginal product gap,
yielding efficiency gains as inputs migrate to a more productive use.
The existing literature has, broadly speaking, followed two approaches in estimating the
gains associated with structural modernisation. The first employs some variant of regressing
output on an indicator of agricultural (over)employment (e.g. Temin (2002)). The second
strategy involves choosing a functional form for the relationship between output and structural
modernisation (Stiroh, 2002). Within this approach, at least in economic history research, shift-
share analysis is widely used (Broadberry, 1998; Timmer and de Vries, 2009).
Both strands of research typically rely on unrealistic identification assumptions. Such re-
search typically does not make a distinction between average and marginal products, or either
implicitly or explicitly assume that the change in sectoral marginal product gap mirrors the
change in the sectoral average product gap. This is misleading, because an average product
gap can indicate efficiency, rather than inefficiency. Productivity gains stemming from a better
allocation of resources can be brought about only through a narrowing of the difference in the
marginal product gap between sectors, not due to a narrowing of the difference in their average
products (Herrendorf, Rogerson, and Valentinyi, 2014).
A.3.2 The model
The aim of dividing the economy into two parts is to identify reallocation gains associated with
a transfer of factors from agriculture to non-agriculture. Stated and subsequent assumptions
about production functions and technological parameters serve to identify and then to remove
the sectoral gap in marginal products of physical and human capital. With these aims in sight,
equations 2 and 3 in the main text can be expressed in per worker terms by dividing them by
aggregate labour:
Ya
L
= Aa
(
R
L
)γ (K
L
)β ((hL)
L
)1−γ−β
kβa q
1−γ−β
a (26)
Yna
L
= Ana
(
K
L
)α((hL)
L
)1−α
(1− ka)α (1− qa)1−α (27)
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where ka is the share of total physical capital employed in agriculture, and qa is the share of
total human capital employed in agriculture. Note that equations 26 and 27 concern themselves
with the share of human capital employed in agriculture ,(hL)a/(hL)t, rather than the share
of labour engaged in agriculture, La/Lt. It is important to stress this distinction because the
gap in the sectoral marginal product of labour may not reflect inefficiency if agriculture and
non-agriculture differ in endowments of human capital (Vollrath, 2009).
With sector-specific production functions established, the static problem is to calculate a
hypothetical aggregate level of income per worker, y∗, that is maximised over the share of
physical and human capital employed in agriculture, y∗ = max
kaqa
(y). Given equations 26 and 27,
the identity y∗ = max
kaqa
(y) can be expanded into:
y∗ = max
kaqa
[Ωak
β
a q
1−γ−β
a + Ωna (1− ka)α (1− qa)1−α] (28)
where for notational simplicity:
Ωa = Aa
(
R
L
)γ (K
L
)β ((hL)
L
)1−γ−β
(29)
and:
Ωna = Ana
(
K
L
)α((hL)
L
)1−α
(30)
First order conditions of equation 28 require identical marginal productivity of human and
physical capital in agriculture and non-agriculture. Differentiating sector specific output with
respect to human capital employment share in both sectors yields:
(1− γ − β)Ωakβa q−γ−βa = (1− α)Ωna (1− ka)α (1− qa)−α (31)
For physical capital:
βΩak
β−1
a q
1−γ−β
a = αΩna (1− ka)α−1 (1− qa)1−α (32)
Assuming that 1 − α − β is equal to 1 − α, i.e. that the labour share of output is identical in
the two sectors, equation 31 can be solved for the share of human capital engaged in agriculture
that maximises aggregate income per worker, q∗a:
q∗a =
1
1−
(
Ωna(1−ka)α
Ωak
β
a
) 1
α
(33)
Any increase in non-agricultural TFP to agricultural TFP (embedded respectively in Ωna
and Ωa) implies a shift of human capital out of agriculture. The same holds for the employment
share of physical capital. Furthermore, and more implicit, under the assumption that α (non-
agricultural physical capital share) is greater than β (agricultural physical capital share), any
increase in aggregate physical capital stock implies a shift of human capital out of agriculture.
The income maximising share of physical capital employed in agriculture, k∗a, is found by
substituting equation 33 into equation 32:
k∗a =
(
β
α
) α
α−β
(
Ωa
Ωna
) 1
α−β
(34)
Holding factor shares constant, income maximising share of physical capital employed in agri-
culture depends on the ratio of, broadly conceived, agricultural to non-agricultural productivity
41
(Ωa and Ωna). Given factor shares, equation 28 can now be solved to obtain the potential income
per worker in each region at each point in time, holding constant the aggregate levels of human
and physical capital, the value of land, and sector-specific TFP’s.
A.4 Robustness checks
In this section, I test the sensitivity of my baseline results. Namely, that 1) MDRs experienced
higher TFP growth rates than the LDRs, and that 2) TFP gradually accounted for a larger frac-
tion of income differences in Yugoslavia. The baseline results remain qualitatively unchanged or
similar to alternative technological parameters, depreciation rates, returns to years of schooling,
and data. But, of course, the exact quantitative significance of results changes. I also provide
a descriptive analysis of how the assumption of unit elasticity of factor substitution, constant
returns to scale, and other assumptions related to the estimation of reallocation gains, might
affect my baseline findings.
A.4.1 Alternative labour shares
The assumption of perfectly competitive markets is rigid for a socialist economy. Yugoslavia was
certainly characterised by markets that were imperfectly competitive. As such, factor shares do
not necessarily reflect the elasticity of output with respect to each input. The technological
parameters might be mismeasured. In particular, to the extent that monopoly profits are re-
flected in capital income, the elasticity of output with respect to capital will be overestimated.
In regards to labour, to the extent that socialist regimes suppressed wages to fund investment,
the elasticity of output with respect to labour will be underestimated.
The elasticity of output with respect to each input serves as weight. The larger the elasticity
on, say, human capital, the larger will be the impact of human capital on the growth rate
and level of output. Under constant returns to scale however, these elasticities sum to one.
Increasing the explanatory power of human capital also means lowering the explanatory power
of physical capital and land. Given that in Yugoslavia human capital grew slower than physical
capital, one would expect that increasing the elasticity of output with respect to human capital
at the expense of physical capital would increase the importance of TFP in accounting for the
differences in the growth rate and the level of output.
Here, I test the sensitivity of my results to the elasticity on human capital. I find that
changing the elasticity on human capital uniformly across regions keeps my baseline findings
qualitatively identical.37 I therefore prefer to present here a much more aggressive robustness
check which is designed to go strongly against my baseline findings. From the benchmark level
of 0.57 for the aggregate economy, I increase the elasticity of output with respect to human
capital in the LDRs and Serbia to an upper bound of plausibility of 0.67.38 I decrease the same
elasticity in the MDRs to a lower bound of plausibility of 0.47. The difference in the elasticity on
human capital between the two regional groupings is therefore 0.2. Attaching a higher elasticity
on human capital in the LDRs serves to increase their TFP growth rates and TFP levels, while
attaching a lower elasticity on human capital in the MDRs serves to decrease their TFP growth
rates and TFP levels. This exercise should, therefore, substantially reduce the TFP gap between
the LDRs and the MDRs.
Before presenting the results of this exercise, it is important to note that is generally conceived
that poorer countries tend to have a lower elasticity on human capital than richer countries. But,
37I ran two scenarios. From the baseline elasticity on human capital of 0.57 for the aggregate economy, I
pushed it first to a lower bound of plausibility of 0.47 - a decrease of 0.10 points. In the second scenario, I pushed
the elasticity to an upper bound of plausibility of 0.67, i.e. I increased the elasticity on human capital by 0.10
points compared to the baseline scenario. In both cases, the results are qualitatively identical to the baseline
findings.
38Increasing the elasticity on human capital in Serbia further goes against my results. It will decrease the
fraction of regional productivity differentials that can be attributed to TFP.
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Table 9: Sources of growth, 1953-86, in %, average compound annual growth rate
YUG BIH CRO KOS MK ME SRB SLO VOJ σ2
Aggregate output 5.02 4.85 4.82 5.39 5.30 5.25 4.90 5.39 5.19 0.05
Aggregate labour -0.41 -0.49 -0.67 -0.12 -0.15 -0.06 -0.37 0.14 -0.73 0.08
Labour productivity 5.43 5.33 5.49 5.51 5.45 5.31 5.27 5.26 5.92 0.04
Of which:
Physical capital 1.67 1.87 2.61 1.98 1.76 1.93 1.70 2.26 2.77 0.14
Human capital 1.17 1.49 0.76 1.52 1.34 1.29 1.15 0.54 0.67 0.13
Land 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.05 0.00
Reallocation gains 0.65 0.70 0.36 0.41 0.56 0.76 0.66 0.44 0.00 0.05
TFP 1.92 1.25 1.72 1.59 1.80 1.32 1.75 2.03 2.44 0.13
Percentage of labour productivity growth due to:
Factors of production 52.72 63.34 62.21 63.74 56.81 60.80 54.38 53.06 58.91 14.51
Reallocation gains 11.90 13.14 6.47 7.46 10.20 14.32 12.43 8.30 -0.03 18.69
TFP 35.38 23.52 31.32 28.80 32.99 24.89 33.19 38.64 41.12 32.83
Notes: YU = Yugoslavia, BIH = Bosnia-Herzegovina, CRO = Croatia, KOS = Kosovo, MK = Macedonia,
ME = Montenegro, SRB = Serbia, SLO = Slovenia, VOJ = Vojvodina, and σ2 = variance.
Table 10: TFP as a source of regional labour productivity level differentials, in %
(1) (2)
Raw TFP Adjusted TFP
1953 3.8 3.5
1961 67.7 54.7
1971 83.6 73.5
1981 81.1 80.9
1986 72.5 75.4
such conceptions are based on estimations prone to measurement error. Upon accounting for self-
employment income, Gollin (2002) finds that labour shares are approximately constant across
countries, irrespective of their development levels. Thus, in Yugoslavia, it seems extremely
unlikely that there were such larger differences in regional technology parameters as I assume
here (0.2). Moreover, if anything, one would expect that MDRs were characterised by a higher
elasticity on human capital than the LDRs, contrary to the assumption of this exercise. If so, this
would strengthen the baseline findings. Nevertheless, it remains interesting to the test whether
the baseline findings remain robust even under assumptions that are arguably implausible.
Tables 9 and 10 show the results when using alternative labour shares. Table 9 recreates
the growth accounting exercise of the baseline case depicted in table 2 of the main text. As
expected, TFP growth among the LDRs is now higher, while TFP growth among the MDRs is
now lower. The baseline result that MDRs experienced a faster growth rate of TFP than the
LDRs generally holds. The exception is Croatia, which now has a lower TFP growth rate than
Macedonia (and Serbia). The results are therefore quantitatively different to the baseline case,
but qualitatively similar.
In table 10 I repeat the development accounting exercise of the baseline case depicted in
table 3 of the main text to get a better sense of TFP divergence dynamics. The results are
qualitatively similar to the baseline case: TFP accounted for a larger fraction of productivity
differentials in Yugoslavia over time. It eventually accounted for more than 70 per cent of the
variation in regional productivity levels. However, the importance of raw TFP in accounting for
regional differentials now peaks in 1971. It subsequently gradually declines by 1981, and then
embarks on a steeper decline until 1986. The importance of adjusted TFP in accounting for the
variation in regional productivity levels peaks in 1981. These results are different to the findings
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of the baseline case. There, both measures of TFP systematically increased over time, with
no reversal of trend. Nevertheless, this robustness check produces results that are qualitatively
similar to the baseline case - the importance of TFP in accounting for regional productivity
differentials dramatically increased over time. For that matter, in table 10, more dramatically
so than in the baseline case.
A.4.2 Alternative depreciation rates
Varying the depreciation rate in the perpetual inventory method changes the relative weight of
old and new investment. A higher depreciation rate increases the relative capital stock of regions
that experienced a higher investment rate towards the end of the sample period. In Yugoslavia,
the LDRs experienced a higher investment rate than the MDRs, converging towards their factor
intensities. However, I find that changing depreciation rates uniformly across regions affects my
results minimally.39 For this reason, I rather present here a much more aggressive robustness
check. As in the previous robustness check, it is designed to go strongly against my baseline
findings. I assign a greater weight to capital stock growth in the MDRs, while assigning a lower
weight to capital stock growth in the LDRs. I commensurately increase the relative weight of
TFP in the LDRs at the expense of TFP in the MDRs. I increase the depreciation rate in the
LDRs and Serbia for each asset type by 50 per cent compared to the baseline case. For the
MDRs on the other hand, I decrease the depreciation rate of each asset type by 50 per cent. The
LDRs and Serbia therefore have 300 per cent higher depreciation rates than the MDRs in this
setting. Before I present the results, note that if I instead gave higher depreciation rates to the
MDRs, and lower depreciation rates to the LDRs, this would strengthen my baseline findings.
Tables 11 and 12 show the findings when using alternative depreciation rates. Table 11
recreates the growth accounting exercise of the baseline case depicted in table 2 of the main
text. As expected, TFP growth among the LDRs is now higher, while TFP growth among
the MDRs is now lower. The results are overall very similar to the previous robustness check.
The MDRs generally experienced a faster growth rate of TFP than the LDRs did. As in the
previous robustness check where I use alternative labour shares, the exception is Croatia. That
region now has a lower TFP growth rate than Macedonia (and Serbia). The results are therefore
quantitatively different to the baseline case, but qualitatively reasonably similar.
In table 12 I repeat the development accounting exercise of the baseline case depicted in table
3. The results are qualitatively similar to the baseline case - TFP accounted for a larger fraction
of productivity differentials in Yugoslavia over time. However, the importance of TFP is now
quantitatively smaller. The importance of raw TFP in accounting for regional differentials peaks
in 1971. This finding is identical to the previous robustness check that uses alternative labour
shares. The importance of adjusted TFP in accounting for regional productivity differentials
peaks in 1971, too. Nevertheless, the importance of TFP in accounting for the variation in
productivity differentials increases substantially over time.
A.4.3 Alternative returns to years of schooling
In this section, I assess the sensitivity of my results to returns to years of schooling. Returns
to years of schooling effectively serve as a weights on human capital as a source of output in
relation to TFP. For example, by assuming higher returns to years of schooling, I would attach a
greater weight to human capital as a source of labour productivity growth at the expense of TFP.
However, Bevc (1993) finds that returns to years of schooling in Yugoslavia were very similar
to returns to years of schooling in other intermediately developed countries in Psacharopoulos
(1985), on whose later work Hall and Jones (1999) rely on. Thus, the assumption in the baseline
39I ran two scenarios. In the first one, I doubled the depreciation rates. In the second one, I halved the
depreciation rates. The results of the baseline case are qualitatively identical. The quantitative results of the
baseline development account exercise remain virtually identical.
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Table 11: Sources of growth, 1953-86, in %, average compound annual growth rate
YUG BIH CRO KOS MK ME SRB SLO VOJ σ2
Aggregate output 5.02 4.85 4.82 5.39 5.30 5.25 4.90 5.39 5.19 0.05
Aggregate output 5.02 4.85 4.82 5.39 5.30 5.25 4.90 5.39 5.19 0.05
Aggregate labour -0.41 -0.49 -0.67 -0.12 -0.15 -0.06 -0.37 0.14 -0.73 0.08
Labour productivity 5.43 5.33 5.49 5.51 5.45 5.31 5.27 5.26 5.92 0.04
Of which:
Physical capital 2.24 2.25 2.38 2.40 2.08 2.31 2.01 2.10 2.55 0.03
Human capital 0.99 1.26 0.92 1.29 1.14 1.10 0.98 0.65 0.81 0.04
Land 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.04 0.00
Reallocation gains 0.48 0.52 0.49 0.26 0.39 0.49 0.49 0.55 -0.01 0.03
TFP 1.68 1.27 1.66 1.54 1.84 1.40 1.77 1.97 2.53 0.13
Percentage of labour productivity growth due to:
Factors of production 60.10 66.46 60.86 67.30 59.00 64.38 57.20 52.19 57.45 23.53
Reallocation gains 8.85 9.71 8.84 4.81 7.22 9.31 9.31 10.37 -0.10 10.82
TFP 31.05 23.84 30.29 27.89 33.78 26.32 33.49 37.44 42.65 33.39
Notes: YU = Yugoslavia, BIH = Bosnia-Herzegovina, CRO = Croatia, KOS = Kosovo, MK = Macedonia,
ME = Montenegro, SRB = Serbia, SLO = Slovenia, VOJ = Vojvodina, and σ2 = variance.
Table 12: TFP as a source of regional labour productivity level differentials, in %
(1) (2)
Raw TFP Adjusted TFP
1953 30.6 52.1
1961 59.7 57.6
1971 71.0 69.7
1981 66.7 67.9
1986 58.9 63.5
setting that returns to years of schooling in Yugoslavia were identical to those in Hall and Jones
(1999) is a reasonable approximation. Nevertheless, it remains interesting to assess the sensitivity
of my baseline results to returns to years of schooling. Similar to previous robustness checks,
I find that either increasing or decreasing the returns to years of schooling uniformly across
regions affects my results minimally. As in the previous robustness checks, I therefore present
here a more aggressive robustness check which is designed to go against my baseline findings. I
increase the returns to years of schooling in the MDRs at each level of educational attainment
by 20 per cent compared to the baseline levels. In the LDRs and Serbia, I decrease the returns
to years of schooling at each level of educational attainment by 20 per cent compared to the
baseline setting. The LDRs therefore have a 50 per cent lower returns to years of schooling than
the MDRs. By this setting, I increase the relative weight of TFP in the LDRs at the expense of
TFP in the MDRs.
Before I present the results, note that is is extremely unlikely that the LDRs had lower returns
to years of schooling than the MDRs. Bevc (1993) finds that returns to years of schooling in
the LDRs were typically higher than in the MDRs. Indeed, this is implied by figure 9 in main
text. Wage rate in the LDRs exceeded the MPH to a larger extent than the wage rate in the
MDRs. It seems more likely that returns to years of schooling were actually higher in the LDRs.
If so, this would strengthen my baseline findings. TFP growth rates and levels in the MDRs
would increase relative to TFP growth rates and levels in the LDRs. Nevertheless, it remains
interesting to the test whether the baseline findings remain robust even under assumptions that
are arguably implausible.
Tables 13 and 14 show the results when using alternative returns to years of schooling.
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Table 13: Sources of growth, 1953-86, in %, average compound annual growth rate
YUG BIH CRO KOS MK ME SRB SLO VOJ σ2
Aggregate output 5.02 4.85 4.82 5.39 5.30 5.25 4.90 5.39 5.19 0.05
Aggregate labour -0.41 -0.49 -0.67 -0.12 -0.15 -0.06 -0.37 0.14 -0.73 0.08
Labour productivity 5.43 5.33 5.49 5.51 5.45 5.31 5.27 5.26 5.92 0.04
Of which:
Physical capital 2.19 2.45 2.11 2.60 2.30 2.53 2.22 1.83 2.24 0.05
Human capital 0.80 1.02 1.10 1.03 0.91 0.88 0.78 0.57 0.74 0.03
Land 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.04 0.00
Reallocation gains 0.56 0.61 0.40 0.33 0.48 0.60 0.57 0.55 0.06 0.03
TFP 1.85 1.24 1.84 1.54 1.76 1.29 1.68 2.32 2.84 0.25
Percentage of labour productivity growth due to:
Factors of production 55.54 65.44 59.22 66.16 58.96 64.41 57.47 45.42 51.04 46.27
Reallocation gains 10.30 11.36 7.37 5.99 8.74 11.29 10.73 10.44 1.04 10.98
TFP 34.16 23.20 33.41 27.85 32.31 24.30 31.81 44.13 47.92 68.33
Notes: YU = Yugoslavia, BIH = Bosnia-Herzegovina, CRO = Croatia, KOS = Kosovo, MK = Macedonia,
ME = Montenegro, SRB = Serbia, SLO = Slovenia, VOJ = Vojvodina, and σ2 = variance.
Table 14: TFP as a source of regional labour productivity level differentials, in %
(1) (2)
Raw TFP Adjusted TFP
1953 6.6 23.7
1961 57.1 53.6
1971 68.5 65.8
1981 65.5 67.6
1986 62.2 67.5
Table 13 recreates the growth accounting exercise of the baseline setting depicted in table 2. As
expected, TFP growth among the LDRs is now higher, while TFP growth among the MDRs is
now lower. But, as in the baseline case, MDRs experienced higher TFP growth rates than the
LDRs did. The results are therefore qualitatively identical to the baseline setting.
In table 14 I repeat the development accounting exercise of the baseline case depicted in
table 3. The results are qualitatively very similar to the baseline case - TFP accounted for
a larger fraction of productivity differentials in Yugoslavia over time. The increase of the ex-
planatory power of TFP in accounting for the variation in labour productivity levels over the
benchmark years is larger than in the baseline setting, although the explanatory power of TFP
is quantitatively smaller at each measured point in time.
A.4.4 Alternative data: Official output
In this section, I asses the sensitivity of my baseline findings to the GDP data I constructed for
this paper. I assess it by using official output data. In order to make the sectoral coverage of
capital and labour data identical to that of official output, I subtract the non-productive sectors
from the capital and labour data. To the extent that official data overestimates the growth
rate of actual output, I expect this exercise to increase the growth rate of output that can be
attributed to TFP, given that TFP is estimated as residual growth after accounting for the
growth rate of inputs and the reallocation gains. Of course, now the capital and labour data is
also different. Potential differences in the findings under this setting and the baseline setting can
not be attributed solely to alternative output data. Adjusted capital and labour data impacts
the results as well.
Tables 15 and 16 show the findings when using alternative data. Table 15 recreates the
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Table 15: Sources of growth, 1953-86, in %, average compound annual growth rate
YUG BIH CRO KOS MK ME SRB SLO VOJ σ2
Aggregate output 5.37 5.04 5.17 5.35 5.69 5.72 5.30 5.87 5.51 0.07
Aggregate labour -0.67 -0.76 -0.95 -0.55 -0.41 -0.36 -0.59 -0.07 -1.02 0.09
Labour productivity 6.04 5.79 6.13 5.90 6.10 6.08 5.89 5.94 6.53 0.05
Of which:
Physical capital 2.36 2.46 2.27 3.07 2.53 2.90 2.42 1.94 2.59 0.11
Human capital 1.00 1.27 0.94 1.28 1.15 1.13 0.98 0.67 0.82 0.04
Land 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.00
Reallocation gains 0.36 0.49 0.45 0.16 0.32 0.68 0.27 0.50 -0.04 0.04
TFP 2.28 1.54 2.44 1.34 2.10 1.35 2.18 2.82 3.12 0.39
Percentage of labour productivity growth due to:
Factors of production 56.31 65.02 52.85 74.59 60.39 66.63 58.44 44.06 52.84 79.75
Reallocation gains 5.93 8.46 7.34 2.67 5.18 11.18 4.58 8.44 -0.64 12.30
TFP 37.76 26.52 39.81 22.74 34.43 22.19 36.99 47.51 47.80 91.69
Notes: YU = Yugoslavia, BIH = Bosnia-Herzegovina, CRO = Croatia, KOS = Kosovo, MK = Macedonia,
ME = Montenegro, SRB = Serbia, SLO = Slovenia, VOJ = Vojvodina, and σ2 = variance.
Table 16: TFP as a source of regional labour productivity level differentials, in %
(1) (2)
Raw TFP Adjusted TFP
1953 11.9 45.0
1961 65.5 63.8
1971 83.8 78.7
1981 77.6 80.5
1986 78.4 81.4
growth accounting exercise of the baseline case depicted in table 2. TFP growth rates are now
generally higher, as expected. Kosovo is an exception. Its rate of TFP growth faces is identical
to the baseline case. Overall, the findings are very similar to the baseline case. TFP growth
was higher among the MDRs than among the LDRs. For growth accounting purposes, official
output data therefore does not distort the baseline qualitative findings.
In table 16 I repeat the development accounting exercise of the baseline case depicted in
table 3. The results are qualitatively identical to the baseline case - TFP accounted for a
larger fraction of the variation in productivity levels over time. The importance of TFP is now
quantitatively smaller at each benchmark year, as official data compresses the true extent of the
variation in labour productivity levels. However, the initial divergence in TFP levels between
1961 and 1953 is larger in this setting than in the baseline setting.
A.4.5 Other issues
Unit elasticity of substitution between capital and labour The Cobb-Douglas assump-
tion of unit substitution between capital and labour might be wrong. In an seminal paper,
Weitzman (1970) argues that the Soviet economy is better represented by constant elasticity of
substitution (CES) between capital and labour that is (significantly) below one. Easterly and
Fischer (1995) later argue the same using updated data. Sapir (1980) makes the same argument
for Yugoslavia.
Elasticity of factor substitution below unity could provide an elegant explanation for both
the success and failure episodes of Yugoslavia. An economy characterized by it should run into
acute diminishing returns on capital as labour becomes increasingly scarce, leading to a sharp
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slowdown in economic growth. Under this line of argumentation, Cobb-Douglas production
function overestimates the contribution of capital deepening to growth because it fails to register
the true extent of diminishing MPK. It commensurately underestimates the contribution of TFP
growth. More explicitly, if Yugoslavia was characterised by CES below one, I underestimate TFP
growth. Regionally, TFP growth in the LDRs would be underestimated to a larger extent than
TFP growth in the MDRs because the LDRs experienced a faster growth of physical capital.
The above conclusion must be strongly qualified however. It is based on the unlikely as-
sumption of Hicks neutrality of technological change assumed in the CES estimates. If the
capital intensity bias mattered, which can be interpreted as a capital using bias in technological
change, MPK decline under CES estimates would be mitigated. The estimations would then
more closely resemble the findings under the baseline setting that rest on the Cobb-Douglas
production function.
Irrespective of these technical considerations, there are, however, at least three reasons that
go against the hypothesis that elasticity of factor substitution was lower than one. First, Yu-
goslavia relied on importing Western technology. This was largely caused by Yugoslavia’s isola-
tion from the Soviet Bloc in the late 1940s and the early 1950s. It seems unclear why the country
would then face a fundamentally different production function compared to OECD countries,
which are largely considered to be characterised by Cobb-Douglas production functions. Second,
all Yugoslav regions stagnated in the 1980s, notwithstanding the differences in their economic
structures and unemployment levels, or levels of idle labour. Third, the estimation of CES de-
pends on the underlying quality of data. While existing research typically uses revised output
data, it relies on official investment. This is problematic. Vonyó (2017) argues that investment
data was substantially overestimated by government statisticians, too. The existing research, by
relying on official investment data, systematically overestimates the role of capital accumulation.
This creates a downward bias in the estimation of elasticity of factor substitution in econometric
exercises.
Constant returns to scale The assumption of constant returns to scale might poorly describe
agriculture or non-agriculture, or both. The premise of New Economic Geography is based on in-
creasing returns to scale. If, for example, non-agriculture was characterised by increasing returns
to scale, perhaps due to externalities among physical and human capital, I would overestimate
TFP. TFP would capture externalities brought about by factor accumulation. Conversely, if
agriculture was characterised by decreasing returns to scale, the decomposition exercises would
underestimate TFP. Nevertheless, the assumption that both agriculture and non-agriculture in
Yugoslavia were characterised by constant returns to scale is corroborated by empirical research.
Boyd (1987) estimates the Yugoslav agricultural production function. He finds that the elastic-
ity of agricultural output with respect to each input summed to 0.99. Sapir (1980) estimates
the Yugoslav manufacturing production function. He finds that the elasticity of manufacturing
output with respect to each input summed to 1.
Even if, say, non-agriculture was rather characterised by increasing returns to scale, this
would strengthen my findings. The LDRs experienced a faster growth rate of physical and
human capital than the MDRs. Externality effects would therefore be higher in the LDRs than
in the MDRs. TFP growth in the LDRs would decrease to a larger extent than TFP growth in
the MDRs, reinforcing my baseline findings.
Estimation of reallocation gains: Static vs. dynamic environment, demand effects,
and welfare implications Reallocation gains are estimated within a static environment. In
the model, there is no dynamic interaction between sector-specific physical and human capital.
For example, in a static setting, the transfer of human capital from agriculture to non-agriculture
decreases the marginal product gap by increasing the marginal product of human capital in
agriculture, while decreasing it in non-agriculture. This process causes an increase in aggregate
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efficiency. In a dynamic setting, physical capital would follow human capital in response to a
more efficient allocation of human capital, reinforcing the impact on aggregate efficiency. Thus,
within a dynamic setting, reallocation gains would likely be higher than within a static setting.
It therefore seems likely that this paper underestimates actual reallocation gains and hence
overestimates TFP growth.
As a reminder, reallocation gains are determined as a ratio of actual to potential income,
where potential income is simulated. Estimated potential income does not reflect potential
changes in relative prices arising from demand effects. A shift of factors from agriculture would
decrease agricultural production, leading to an increase in agricultural prices, which would in-
crease the marginal product of the remaining factors. Neglecting demand effects thus over-
estimates reallocation gains. Nevertheless, Vollrath (2009) reports that simulated changes in
relative prices have a minor impact on measured reallocation gains. Furthermore, this appears
to be an unlikely issue within a socialist system where prices were largely administered.
Finally, the model neglects costs that are associated with migration. For example, next
to pecuniary costs, labour migration involves physic costs. Nevertheless, it is important to
distinguish efficiency gains from the perspective of aggregate economy, and welfare implications
at individual or societal level. While structural modernisation certainly has strong, more broader,
welfare implications, this paper exclusively focuses on productivity implications.
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